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INTRODUCTION 
Tontines are investment vehicles that can be used to provide retirement 
income. A tontine is a financial product that combines the features of an 
annuity and a lottery.1 In a simple tontine, a group of investors pool their 
money together to buy a portfolio of investments and, as investors die, their 
shares are forfeited, with the entire fund going to the last surviving inves-
tor. Over the years, this “last survivor takes all” approach has made for some 
great fiction.2 For example, in an episode of the popular television series 
M*A*S*H, Colonel Sherman T. Potter, as the last survivor of his World War 
I unit, got to open the bottle of French cognac that he and his buddies 
bought (and share it with his Korean War compatriots).3 On the other hand, 
sometimes the fictional plots involved nefarious characters trying to kill off 
the rest of the investors to “inherit” the fund.4 
 
1 See Moshe A. Milevsky & Thomas S. Salisbury, Optimal Retirement Tontines for the 21st 
Century: With Reference to Mortality Derivatives in 1693, at 2 (May 28, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2271259 (describing tontines as “[p]art 
annuity, part lottery and part hedge fund”). An annuity is a financial instrument (e.g., an 
insurance contract) that converts a lump sum of money into a stream of income payable over a 
period of years, typically for life. The person holding an annuity is called an annuitant. See infra 
subsection I.C.2. 
2 See, e.g., Tontine, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tontine (last modified Oct. 22, 
2014) (click on Popular Culture), archived at http://perma.cc/3UD5-FFE6 (listing plays, movies, 
television episodes, and books that feature tontines). 
3 M*A*S*H: Old Soldiers (CBS television broadcast Jan. 21, 1980). 
4 See, e.g., The Simpsons: Raging Abe Simpson and His Grumbling Grandson in “The Curse of the 
Flying Hellfish” (Fox television broadcast Apr. 28, 1996) (depicting an episode in which Grampa 
Simpson reveals to his grandson Bart that he and Montgomery Burns were part of a World War II 
American army unit that stole priceless art from a German castle, which the last surviving unit 
member will inherit); see also The Wild Wild West: The Night of the Tottering Tontine (CBS television 
broadcast Jan. 6, 1967) (portraying Jim and Arte protecting a member of an investment group 
whose last surviving member would inherit the group’s assets). 
Having an incentive to kill someone to earn a profit is an example of what actuaries call a 
“moral hazard.” See Moral Hazard, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
m/moralhazard.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9DHX-FXK8 (defining 
“moral hazard” as “[t]he risk that a party to a transaction has not entered into the contract in good 
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Of course, tontines can be designed to avoid such mischief. For example, 
instead of distributing all of the contributions to the last survivor, a tontine 
could make periodic distributions. Historically, for example, governments 
issued tontines instead of regular bonds.5 In those tontines, the government 
would keep the tontine investors’ contributions but make high annual 
dividend payments to the tontine, dividing those payments among the 
surviving investors.6 When the last survivor died, the government had no 
further debt obligation. For example, in 1693, the English government 
issued a tontine to raise one million British pounds to help pay for its war 
against France.7 At a time when the regular bond interest rate was capped at 
6%, King William’s 1693 tontine, as it is known, entitled the surviving 
investors to share in 10% dividend payments to the tontine for the first 7 
years and to 7% dividend payments thereafter.8 
Over the years, tontines like King William’s became quite popular.9 At 
one point, Alexander Hamilton, the United States’s first Secretary of the 
Treasury, suggested that the United States could use a tontine to pay off its 
Revolutionary War debt.10 All in all, government tontines played an 
important role in government finances over a couple of centuries, but they 
have since disappeared.11  
After the Civil War, tontines emerged as a popular investment for 
individuals in the United States, but they fell out of favor at the beginning 
of the twentieth century.12 The problem was not with the tontine form but 
 
faith, has provided misleading information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity, or has an 
incentive to take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit before the contract settles”). 
5 Milevsky & Salisbury, supra note 1, at 2. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 3; see also Moshe A. Milevsky, Portfolio Choice and Longevity Risk in the Late Seventeenth 
Century: A Re-Examination of the First English Tontine, FIN. HIST. REV., Oct. 22, 2014, at 1, 4-5 
(explaining that the 1693 tontine was a wealthy person’s investment because it required a 100-
pound contribution at a time when the average laborer made only 16 pounds per year). 
8 Milevsky & Salisbury, supra note 1, at 5; see also Milevsky, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that the 
structure of the 1693 tontine combatted moral hazard by freezing payments when only 7 members 
remained). 
9 See, e.g., ROBERT W. COOPER, AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TONTINE PRINCIPLE 
6-9 (J. David Cummins ed., 1972) (discussing the English tontine’s effect on early America). See 
generally Kent McKeever, A Short History of Tontines, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491 (2010) 
(discussing the early history of the tontine and its possible modern revival). 
10 Robert M. Jennings et al., Alexander Hamilton’s Tontine Proposal, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 107, 
110-11 (1988). 
11 See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 9, at 2-9 (tracing the early history of tontines in France, 
England, and the United States). 
12 See, e.g., id. at 10-17, 21-22 (discussing the rise of tontines in the United States, the defects 
inherent in the original tontine policies, and the abuses of the system that led to their demise); 
 
  
2015] Tontine Pensions 759 
 
with embezzlement and fraud by the holders of tontine funds.13 Investiga-
tions of the insurance industry in New York led to the enactment of 
legislation in 1906 that all but banned tontines, and tontines have since 
been replaced by life insurance and similar financial products.14 
We believe that the time has come to revive tontines as a way of 
providing reliable, pension-like income for retirees. Specifically, we believe 
that variations on the tontine principle—that the share of each member of 
the tontine, at her death, is enjoyed by the survivors—can be used to 
develop a variety of attractive retirement-income financial products. For 
example, tontines could be used to create “tontine annuities” that could be 
sold to individual investors.15 These tontine annuities would make periodic 
distributions to surviving investors, but unlike traditional tontines, tontine 
annuities would solicit new investors to replace those that have died.16 
Structured in this way, a tontine annuity could operate in perpetuity.17 
In this Article, we consider how the tontine principle could be used to 
create “tontine pensions” through which large employers could provide 
retirement income for their employees. These tontine pensions would have 
several major advantages over most of today’s pensions, annuities, and other 
retirement income products. 
At the outset, Part I of this Article explains how the current U.S. 
retirement system works and how retirees can use pensions, annuities, and 
other financial products to generate retirement income. 
Next, Part II offers a step-by-step explanation of how tontine funds, 
tontine annuities, and tontine pensions could work today. It then compares 
tontine pensions with traditional defined benefit pension plans, defined 
 
McKeever, supra note 9, at 507-11 (detailing the nineteenth century beginnings of tontine-like 
insurance policies in the United States and the legislative backlash to tontines). 
13 See McKeever, supra note 9, at 511 (“The contemporary assessment . . . is that the tontine 
aspect of the standard insurance policies served as a distraction and scapegoat in coming up with 
remedies for the range of vices in the industry. The problem was not with the form, but with self-
dealing management.” (footnote omitted)).  
14 See COOPER, supra note 9, at 43-57 (discussing the findings of the Armstrong Committee, 
a committee created by the New York legislature to investigate the life insurance business, which 
led to legislation virtually banning tontine policies by forbidding insurance companies from 
deferring dividend payments beyond one year); see also Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for 
the Young Invincibles, REGULATION, Winter 2009–2010, at 26, available at http://object. 
cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2009/11/v32n4-4.pdf (describing anti-tontine 
regulations in New York and their effect on life and health insurance companies). 
15 See generally Michael J. Sabin, Fair Tontine Annuity (Mar. 26, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1579932 (explaining how a “fair tontine annuity” 
could function). 
16 Id. at 12, 22. 
17 Id. at 22. 
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contribution plans, and so-called “hybrid pensions” (e.g., cash balance 
plans). In particular, Part II shows that tontine pensions would have two 
major advantages over traditional pensions. First, unlike traditional pen-
sions—which are frequently underfunded—tontine pensions would always 
be fully funded. Second, unlike a traditional pension—in which the pension 
plan sponsor must bear all the investment and actuarial risks—with a 
tontine pension, the plan sponsor bears neither of those risks. These two 
features should make tontine pensions a particularly attractive alternative 
for employers who wish to provide retirement income security for their 
employees but want to avoid the risks associated with a traditional pension. 
Part III then develops a model tontine pension for a typical large 
employer. We then use that model to estimate the benefits that would be 
paid to retirees. For simplicity, the model assumes that, each year, an 
employer would contribute 10% of each employee’s salary to a tontine 
pension (in the real world, employers could choose to contribute a greater 
or lesser percentage of salary on behalf of their employees). The model 
generates tontine pension benefits for each retiree that would closely 
resemble an actuarially fair variable annuity—i.e., one without high insur-
ance company fees (“loads”).18 Specifically, unlike commercial annuities 
which must support insurance agent commissions, insurance company 
reserves, risk-taking, and profits, the management and recordkeeping fees 
associated with running a tontine pension would be minimal. That means 
that tontine pensions would provide significantly higher retirement benefits 
than commercial annuities. 
Part IV shows how such a model tontine pension could be used to 
replace a typical, large, traditional pension plan like the California State 
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). Like so many other state-run 
pension plans, CalSTRS is underfunded; for example, as of June 30, 2013, 
CalSTRS was just 66.9% funded, with an unfunded liability of almost $74 
billion.19 While replacing CalSTRS with a tontine pension would do 
nothing to reduce that $74 billion obligation, it would ensure that California 
 
18 A variable annuity is an annuity that offers a range of investment options. Accordingly, the 
value of the annuity and the monthly payments will vary depending on the performance of the 
underlying investments. See Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/Z4BV-VXY2 (describing the basics of variable annuities). 
19 NICK J. COLLIER ET AL., MILLIMAN, CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM DEFINED BENEFIT PROGRAM—2013 ACTUARIAL VALUATION 10 (2014), available at http:// 
www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/2013_db_valuation_report.pdf; see also infra 
Section IV.A (providing background on CalSTRS). 
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would never again have to worry about underfunding attributable to future 
benefit accruals. 
Finally, Part V discusses how to solve some of the technical problems 
that would arise in implementing a tontine pension. 
I. PENSIONS, ANNUITIES, AND OTHER LIFETIME INCOME 
MECHANISMS TODAY 
Longevity risk—the risk of outliving one’s retirement savings—is 
probably the greatest risk facing current and future retirees.20 At present, 
for example, a 65-year-old man has a 50% chance of living to age 88 and a 
25% chance of living to age 96, and a 65-year-old woman has a 50% chance 
of living to age 90 and a 25% chance of living to age 97.21 The joint life 
expectancy of a 65-year-old couple is even more remarkable: there is a 50% 
chance that at least one 65-year-old spouse will live to age 94 and a 25% 
chance that at least one will live to 100.22 In short, most individuals and 
couples will need to plan for the possibility of retirements that can last for 
30 years or more. 
Elderly Americans can generally count on Social Security benefits to 
cover at least a portion of their retirement income needs. In addition, 
retirees use pensions, annuities, and a variety of other mechanisms to ensure 
that they have adequate incomes throughout their retirement years. These 
financial mechanisms are discussed in turn. 
A. Social Security 
Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to most retirees and their 
families.23 A worker builds Social Security protection by working in 
 
20 The top risks for today’s retirees include market volatility, taxes, longevity, healthcare 
needs, and unexpected events. Common Retirement Risks, AMERIPRISE FIN., https:// 
www.ameriprise.com/retire/planning-for-retirement/retirement-risks (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), 
archived at https://perma.cc/QD7S-4UV7. See generally YOUNGKYUN PARK, EMP. BENEFIT 
RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 357, RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY WITH 
IMMEDIATE AND LONGEVITY ANNUITIES (2001), available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_05-2011_No357_Annuities.pdf (discussing strategies for individuals with 
retirement income to manage three types of risk: investment income, longevity, and long-term 
care). 
21 PRUDENTIAL, SHOULD AMERICANS BE INSURING THEIR RETIREMENT INCOME? 3 
(2013), available at http://research.prudential.com/documents/rp/InsuringRetirementIncome.pdf? 
doc=InsuringRetirementIncome&bu=SI&ref=website&cid=2.  
22 Id. 
23 See JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 184-90 (2006) (giving an 
overview of the Social Security system); Staff of H. Comm. On Ways & Means, 113th Cong., 
Green Book: Background Material and Data on the Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on 
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employment that is covered by Social Security and paying the applicable 
payroll taxes.24 Workers over age 62 generally are entitled to Social Security 
retirement benefits if they have worked in covered employment for at least 
10 years.25 Benefits are based on a measure of the worker’s earnings history 
in covered employment. Most importantly, benefits are indexed each year 
for inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index.26 While historically 
“full retirement age” was age 65, it is currently age 66, and it is gradually 
increasing to age 67 for workers born after 1959 (who will reach age 67 in or 
after 2027).27 In June 2014, Social Security paid retirement benefits to 38.5 
million retired workers, and the average monthly benefit paid to a retired 
worker was $1300.04.28 
 
Ways and Means (Nov. 2014), http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2014-green-book/chapter-
1-social-security/social-security-introduction-and-overview, archived at http://perma.cc/VN56-
P3TT (“Social Security is a self-financed program that provides monthly cash benefits to retired 
or disabled workers and their family members, and to the family members of deceased workers.”). 
24 For 2015, employees and employers each pay a Social Security retirement tax of 5.6% on 
up to $118,500 of wages, for a combined Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) rate of 10.6%—
the lion’s share of the total 15.3% collected for OASI, Disability Insurance (DI), and Medicare. 
Self-employed workers pay an equivalent combined OASI, DI, and Medicare tax of 15.3% on their 
first $118,500 of net earnings. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET: 2015 SOCIAL SECURITY 
CHANGES, available at http://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/colafacts2015.pdf; Social Security 
& Medicare Tax Rates, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/taxRates.html 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CL9V-JVDX. 
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2012) (describing eligibility for old-age insurance benefits); id. 
§ 414(a)(2) (defining a “fully insured individual” as, among other definitions, an individual having 
at least “40 quarters of coverage”). 
26 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET: 2015 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES, supra note 24. 
27 Retirement Planner: Full Retirement Age, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http:// 
www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/retirechart.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/QX7T-S2TQ. 
28 Monthly Statistical Snapshot, June 2014, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. tbl.2 (July 2014), 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/2014-06.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
9ExJ-C8ZU. In addition, a means-tested Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides 
monthly cash benefits to certain low-income elderly, disabled, or blind Americans. Supplemental 
Security Income Home Page, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/index. 
htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B2S6-4K8T. In 2015, the maximum 
federal SSI benefit for a single individual is $733 per month, and the maximum for a couple is 
$1100 per month. SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2015, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/D72T-6JQV?type=image. In June 2014, 2.1 million elderly Americans received SSI 
benefits from the federal government, and their average monthly benefit was $430.34. Monthly 
Statistical Snapshot, June 2014, supra, tbl.3. 
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B. Pensions 
The United States has a voluntary pension system, and employers can 
decide whether and how to provide pension benefits to their employees.29 
However, when employers do provide pensions, those pensions are typically 
subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA).30 
1. Retirement Savings Are Tax-Favored 
Most pension plans qualify for favorable tax treatment. Basically, 
employer contributions to a pension are not taxable to the employee;31 the 
pension fund’s earnings on those contributions are tax-exempt;32 and 
workers pay taxes only when they receive distributions of their pension 
benefits.33 Nevertheless, the employer is allowed a current deduction for its 
 
29 Jonathan Barry Forman & George A. (Sandy) Mackenzie, The Cost of “Choice” in a 
Voluntary Pension System, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 6.01 (2013). 
30 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.). See generally JOINT COMM. 
ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE TAX TREATMENT 
OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS (2012), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func= 
startdown&id=4418 (providing information about the tax rules applicable to retirement savings 
arrangements). 
31 I.R.C. § 402(b)(1) (2012). 
32 Id. § 501(a). 
33 Id. §§ 72(a)(1), 402(b)(2). See generally IRS, PENSION AND ANNUITY INCOME (2015), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf (explaining the tax treatment of distributions 
from pension and annuity plans). In general, a participant’s pension benefits will be fully taxable if 
the participant’s employer contributed all of the costs for the pension without including any of the 
contributions in the employee’s taxable wages. Id. at 11. On the other hand, if an individual made 
after-tax contributions to a pension or annuity, she can exclude part of her pension or annuity 
distributions from income. Id. More specifically, under I.R.C. §§ 72 and 402, the individual can 
exclude a fraction of each benefit payment from income. That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is 
based on the amount of premiums or other after-tax contributions made by the individual. I.R.C. 
§§ 72(b), 402(c) (2012); see also IRS, supra, at 11-15 (explaining the calculation of the amount of 
pension payments that can be excluded from income). The exclusion ratio enables the individual 
to recover her own after-tax contributions tax free and to pay tax only on the remaining portion of 
benefits which represents income. IRS, supra, at 11-15. Taxpayers who began receiving annuity 
payments from a qualified retirement plan after November 18, 1996 generally can use the so-called 
“Simplified Method” to calculate the tax-free part of their benefits. Id. at 12-13. Under the 
Simplified Method, the Code provides a table with a fixed number of anticipated payments that 
depends upon the annuitant’s age as of the annuity starting date. Id. The taxpayer then divides her 
total after-tax contributions over the applicable number of anticipated payments and excludes the 
amount so determined each year. Id. 
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contributions, within limits.34 Favorable tax rules are also available for 
individual retirement accounts (IRAs)35 and Roth IRAs.36 
2. Types of Pension Plans 
Pension plans generally fall into two broad categories based on the 
nature of the benefits provided: defined benefit plans and defined contribu-
tion plans. 
a. Defined Benefit Plans 
In a defined benefit plan, an employer promises its employees a specific 
benefit at retirement.37 To provide that benefit, the employer typically 
makes payments to a trust fund, the fund grows with investment returns, 
and eventually the employer withdraws money from the trust fund to pay 
the promised benefits.38 Employer contributions are based on actuarial 
valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities.39  
For example, a plan might provide that a worker’s annual retirement 
benefit (B) is equal to 2% multiplied by the number of years of service ( yos) 
multiplied by final average compensation ( fac) (B = 2% × yos × fac). Under 
this traditional, final-average-pay formula, a worker who retires after 30 
years of service with a final average compensation of $50,000 would receive 
a pension of $30,000 a year for life ($30,000 = 2% × 30 yos × $50,000 fac).40 
While many defined benefit plans allow for lump-sum distributions, the 
 
34 I.R.C. § 404(a) (2012). 
35 Id. § 219(a). Almost any worker can set up an IRA with a bank or other financial insti-
tution. In 2015, individuals without pension plans can contribute and deduct up to $5500 to an 
IRA, although individuals over age 50 can contribute and deduct another $1000 (for a total of up to 
$6500), and spouses can contribute and deduct similar amounts. Press Release, IRS, IRS 
Announces 2015 Pension Plan Limitations; Taxpayers May Contribute up to $18,000 to their 401(k) 
Plans in 2015 (Oct. 23, 2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Announces-2015-
Pension-Plan-Limitations-1. 
36 I.R.C. § 408A (2012). Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are not tax deduct-
ible. Id. § 408A(c)(1). Instead, withdrawals are tax free. Id. § 408A(d)(1). Like regular IRAs, 
however, the earnings on Roth IRA investments are tax exempt. Id. § 408A(d)(2). 
37 FORMAN, supra note 23, at 215. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Final average compensation is often computed by averaging the worker’s salary over the 
last three or five years prior to retirement. Alternatively, some plans use career average compensa-
tion instead of final average compensation. Under a career earnings formula, benefits are based on 
a percentage of an average of an employee’s career earnings for every year of service by the 
employee. Id. 
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default benefit is a retirement income stream in the form of an annuity for 
life.41 
Traditional defined benefit plans in the real world are often underfunded 
for a variety of reasons.42 For example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) has already bailed out thousands of failed private-
sector pension plans. Indeed, according to its 2013 annual report, the PBGC 
paid $5.5 billion to 900,000 retirees in more than 4600 failed private 
pension plans in its 2013 fiscal year, and the PBGC expects that another 
620,000 workers will receive benefits when they retire.43 Likewise, at the 
end of July 2014, pension plans sponsored by S&P 1500 companies were 
only 85% funded, reflecting a collective deficit of $340 billion.44 Many 
government pension plans are also underfunded. On average, state public 
pensions in the United States were only 70.9% funded in 2012, reflecting 
cumulative unfunded liabilities of $894 billion.45 
b. Defined Contribution Plans 
Under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer simply determines 
a specified percentage of a worker’s compensation that should be set aside 
and then contributes that percentage to an individual investment account 
 
41 In the United States, defined benefit plans are generally designed to provide annuities, i.e., 
“definitely determinable benefits . . . over a period of years, usually for life, after retirement.” 
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2012). 
42 Traditional defined benefit plans can easily become underfunded for three reasons: (1) the 
employers promise their employees additional benefits for past service, (2) the employers fail to 
make their actuarially required contributions, or (3) the assets held in the plan decline in value 
because of market volatility. 
43 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., HELPING SECURE RETIREMENTS: PBGC ANNUAL 
REPORT 2013, at 5 (2013), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2013-annual-report.pdf. 
44 S&P 1500 Pension Deficits Remain Above Year-End 2013 Levels, MERCER (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://www.mercer.com/newsroom/sp-1500-pension-deficits-remain-above-year-end-2013-
levels0.html, archived at http://perma.cc/YV3Z-G97H; see also S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P 
500 CORPORATE PENSIONS AND OTHER POST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS (OPEB): THE 
FINAL FRONTIER 4 (2014), available at http://www.spindices.com/documents/research/research-
sp500-corporate-pensions-and-opeb-the-final-frontier-2013.pdf (noting that companies in the S&P 
500 were 87.9% funded in the fiscal year 2013, meaning they were underfunded by $224.46 billion). 
45 STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERV., U.S. STATE PENSION FUNDING: STRONG 
INVESTMENT RETURNS COULD LIFT FUNDED RATIOS, BUT LONGER-TERM CHALLENGES 
REMAIN 16-17 tbl.3A (2014), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ 
spf/upload/Events_US/US_PF_Webcast_Pensart1.pdf; see also Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre 
Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, The Funding of State and Local Pensions: 2013–2017, ST. & LOC. 
PENSION PLANS (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Chestnut Hill, Mass.), July 2014, at 2 
(2014), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/slp_39.pdf (finding that a sample 
of 150 state and local plans was just 72% funded in 2013 (underfunded by $1.2 trillion)). 
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for that worker.46 For example, contributions might be set at 10% of annual 
compensation. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $50,000 in a given 
year would have $5000 contributed to an individual investment account on 
her behalf ($5000 = 10% × $50,000). Her benefit at retirement would be 
based on all such contributions, plus investment earnings.47 Unlike 
traditional defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans usually make 
distributions in lump sum or periodic distributions rather than life annuities.48 
There are many different types of defined contribution plans, including 
money purchase pension plans, savings and thrift plans, deferred profit-
sharing plans, savings incentive match plans (SIMPLE), simplified employee 
pensions (SEPs), and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).49 Most 
notably, according to Internal Revenue Code section 401(k), profit-sharing 
and stock bonus plans often include a feature that allows workers to choose 
between receiving cash currently or deferring taxation by placing the money 
in a trust.50 Consequently, these plans are often called “401(k) plans,” and 
they are the most popular type of retirement plan in the United States.51 
The maximum amount of such elective deferrals that can be made by an 
individual in 2015 is $18,000, although workers over the age of 50 can 
contribute another $6000 (for a total of up to $24,000).52 Since 2006, 
employers have also been permitted to set up Roth 401(k) plans.53 
 
46 FORMAN, supra note 23, at 215-16; EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS 
OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 64 (6th ed. 2009), available at http://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/2009/06_DB-DC_RETIREMENT_Funds_2009_EBRI.pdf 
(describing the function and types of defined contribution plans).  
47 Defined contribution plans are also known as “individual account” plans because each 
worker has her own account, as opposed to defined benefit plans, in which the plan’s assets are 
pooled for the benefit of all of the employees. 
48 TOWERS WATSON, INTERNATIONAL PENSION PLAN SURVEY: REPORT 2011, at 15 
(2011), available at http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/ 
2011/12/International-Pension-Plan-survey-2011 (indicating that lump sums distributions are “by 
far the most prevalent” form of distribution for defined contribution plans). 
49 See Six Ways to Save for Retirement, PROGRAM PERSP. (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2011, at 2-3, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/ 
program_perspectives_vol3_issue3.pdf (introducing and describing six types of defined 
contribution plans). 
50 I.R.C. § 401(k) (2012).  
51 BLS Examines Popular 401(k) Retirement Plans, PROGRAM PERSP. (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/ 
program_perspectives_vol2_issue6.pdf (asserting that there has been a “wide-spread movement 
towards defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) and 403(b) . . . in private industry and to a 
lesser extent, in State and local government”). 
52 IRS, supra note 35. 
53 I.R.C. § 402A(b)(1) (2012) (“The term ‘qualified Roth contribution program’ means a 
program under which an employee may elect to make designated Roth contributions in lieu of all 
or a portion of elective deferrals the employee is otherwise eligible to make under the applicable 
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Because retirement benefits are based on the retiree’s individual account 
balance, benefits can vary dramatically depending upon investment returns 
and interest rates. For example, over the past decade, a withdrawal strategy 
based on taking 4% of the balance in a retiree’s account annually would have 
led to dramatically different payouts in the peak stock market years of 2007 
and 2014, as opposed to the bottom of the recession in 2009.54 Using an 
account balance to buy an annuity would also not fully offset those risks, as 
fixed annuity payouts vary with market interest rates,55 and variable annuity 
payouts vary with the performance of the underlying assets (just as they 
would with payouts under a 4% strategy).56 
c. Hybrid Retirement Plans 
So-called “hybrid” retirement plans mix the features of defined benefit 
and defined contribution plans. For example, a cash balance plan is a 
defined benefit plan that closely resembles a defined contribution plan.57 
Like other defined benefit plans, employer contributions are based on 
actuarial valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and 
responsibilities. Like defined contribution plans, however, cash balance 
plans provide workers with individual accounts (albeit hypothetical).58 A 
simple cash balance plan might allocate 10% of salary to each worker’s 
account annually and credit the account with 5% interest on the account’s 
balance. Under such a plan, a worker who earns $50,000 in a given year 
 
retirement plan.”). Unlike regular 401(k) plans, contributions to Roth 401(k) plans are not 
excludable. Id. § 402A(a)(1). Instead, withdrawals are tax free. Id. § 402A(d)(1). Like regular 
401(k) plans, however, the earnings on Roth 401(k) plan investments are tax exempt. Id. 
54 The Dow Jones Industrial Average hit 14,000 in October 2007, fell to around 7000 in Feb-
ruary 2009, and rose to more than 17,000 in September 2014. Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
GOOGLE FINANCE, https://www.google.com/finance?q=INDEXDJX%3A.DJI&ei=bXBqUsidGJ 
C2lAOrxQE (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (follow “Historical Prices” hyperlink, set daily price time 
period, then follow “update” hyperlink); see also infra subsection I.C.1 for a discussion of the so-
called 4% rule. 
55 See The Dangers of Buying an Annuity When Interest Rates are Low, ANNUITY DIG., 
http://www.annuitydigest.com/blog/tom/dangers-buying-annuity-when-interest-rates-are-low (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R8Y9-TKJM (warning how interest rate 
fluctuations can cause annuities to become very expensive because fixed annuity payments are 
based on prevailing interest rates). 
56 David John Marotta, The False Promises of Annuities and Annuity Calculators, FORBES (Aug. 
27, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2012/08/27/the-false-promises-of-
annuities-and-annuity-calculators, archived at http://perma.cc/85V5-9WLB (describing how 
inflation rates change the buying power of the variable annuity). 
57 See Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions, 25 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 387 (2000) (“[A] cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that 
looks like a defined contribution plan.”). 
58 Id. 
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would receive an annual cash balance credit of $5000 ($5000 = 10% × 
$50,000), plus an interest credit equal to 5% of the balance in her hypothet-
ical account as of the beginning of the year. 
3. The Regulation of Employment-Based Plans 
Since ERISA’s enactment, an entire system has emerged to regulate 
pensions.59 Pension plans must be operated for the exclusive benefit of 
employees or their beneficiaries, and plan assets generally must be held in a 
trust.60 To protect the interests of plan participants, ERISA requires 
significant reporting and disclosure in the administration and operation of 
employee benefit plans.61 ERISA also imposes extensive fiduciary responsi-
bilities on employers and administrators of employee benefit plans.62 
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code also impose many other require-
ments on retirement plans, including rules governing normal retirement 
 
59 See, e.g., About PBGC, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., http:// 
www.pbgc.gov/about (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/48R2-LALW (stating 
that PBGC’s purpose is to protect and enhance retirement security for American workers and 
their families); About the Employee Benefits Security Administration, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/main.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZQ68-L8TJ (introducing the Employee Benefits Security Administration’s 
commitment to educating and assisting workers, retirees, and their families covered by private 
retirement plans); Tax Information for Retirement Plans, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
G6UF-Q4AT (providing a wide array of tax-related information and services for retirement 
plans). The IRS and the U.S. Department of Labor also have significant responsibilities with 
respect to IRAs and Roth IRAs. 
60 I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012) (“A trust created or organized in the United States and forming part 
of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his 
employees or their beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified trust under this section . . . .”); 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012) (“Except as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section, all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in 
trust by one or more trustees.”). 
61 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (2012) 
(requiring the plan administrator to provide a summary plan description to plan participants, and 
annual, terminal, and supplementary reports to the Secretary of Labor). 
62 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012) (outlining qualification requirements for qualified pensions, 
profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404, 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2012) (requiring a fiduciary to diversify investments of the plan as 
warranted by the circumstances to minimize the risk of large losses). In addition, prohibited 
transaction rules prevent parties in interest from engaging in certain transactions with an 
employee benefit plan. See I.R.C. § 4975 (2012) (imposing a tax on prohibited transactions 
conducted with disqualified persons); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 406, 29 
U.S.C. § 1106 (2012) (enumerating prohibited transactions for fiduciaries). For example, an 
employer usually cannot sell, exchange, or lease any property to the plan. Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974  § 406(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(A) (2012).  
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age,63 participation,64 coverage,65 vesting standards,66 benefit accrual,67 
limitations on contributions and benefits,68 nondiscrimination,69 and 
minimum funding standards.70 
Pertinent here, federal laws outside of ERISA and the Internal Revenue 
Code can also impose limits on pension plans. For example, even though 
women tend to have longer life expectancies than men,71 Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars pension plans from requiring higher contributions 
from women than men or paying women lower benefits than men.72 
C. Other Sources of Lifetime Income 
In addition to accumulating retirement assets through the Social Security 
and pension systems, individuals can save on their own. Investment income 
is generally subject to federal personal income tax rates of up to 39.6% in 
2015;73 however, dividend income and capital gains are generally taxed at no 
more than a 20% rate.74 Also, there are various tax advantages associated 
 
63 I.R.C. § 411(a)(8) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(24), 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(24) (2012). 
64 I.R.C. § 410(a) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 202, 29 
U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
65 I.R.C. § 410(b) (2012). 
66 I.R.C. § 411(a) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 203, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1053 (2012). 
67 I.R.C. § 411(b) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 204, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1054 (2012). 
68 I.R.C. § 415 (2012). 
69 Id. § 401(a)(4). 
70 Id. § 412; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082 
(2012). 
71 See supra text accompanying note 21. 
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & 
Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074-75 (1983) (per curiam) (finding that Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from paying lower monthly retirement 
benefits to a woman than to a man who has made the same contributions); City of L.A. Dep’t of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (finding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prohibits an employer from requiring female employees to make larger contributions to its 
pension plan than male employees because of mortality table differentials between the sexes). 
73 I.R.C. § 1 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, 861 § 3.01. 
74 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D) (2012). 
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with investing in homes,75 state and local bonds,76 annuities,77 and life 
insurance.78 
Retirees can use a variety of approaches to generate retirement income 
from their voluntary savings.79 One approach is for retirees to commit to 
systematic withdrawals of, for example, 4% of their account balances each 
year—a strategy that has a relatively low risk of ruin (running out of money 
before death).80 Traditional lifetime annuities offer another approach for 
spreading retirement savings out over a lifetime. Another alternative 
involves buying longevity insurance, for example, buying a deferred annuity 
at age 65 that starts making payments only if the annuitant lives past age 
85.81 Retirees can also invest in other financial products that can provide 
guaranteed lifetime benefits. These are discussed in turn. 
1. Systematic Withdrawals 
One of the simplest and most common strategies for managing retirement 
savings is to invest all of the retirement savings in a diversified portfolio and 
then use a conservative withdrawal rate and a systematic withdrawal plan 
(SWP) designed to have a high probability that the retirement savings will 
 
75 For example, home mortgage interest is generally deductible, and gains from the sale of a 
personal residence are often excludable. Id. §§ 121, 163(a)-(h). 
76 For example, gross income does not include interest on any state or local bond. Id. § 103. 
77 See supra note 33 for a more in-depth explanation of how an annuitant can often exclude a 
fraction of each annuity payment from income under I.R.C. § 72 (2012). 
78 See I.R.C. § 101(a) (2012) (excluding life insurance proceeds paid by reason of death of the 
insured from gross income calculations). 
79 See, e.g., GARY C. BHOJWANI, ALLIANZ LIFE INS. CO. OF N. AM., RETHINKING 
WHAT’S AHEAD IN RETIREMENT 13 (2011), available at http://assets.knowledge.allianz.com/ 
downloads/Allianz_life_rethinking_what_s_ahead_in_retirementent_1154.pdf (outlining how annuities 
can generate guaranteed retirement income for life); SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, DESIGNING A 
MONTHLY PAYCHECK FOR RETIREMENT 3-7 (2012), available at http://www.soa.org/ 
workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=30089 (discussing the different options for generating retirement 
income and important factors to consider when deciding which one to choose); Anthony Webb, 
Making Your Nest Egg Last a Lifetime, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., 
Chestnut Hill, Mass.), Sept. 2009, at 2-3, available at https://npers.ne.gov/SelfService/public/ 
howto/publications/MakingYourNesteggLast.pdf (examining alternatives and their tradeoffs on 
how to convert accumulated savings into a monthly paycheck). See generally BONNIE-JEANNE 
MACDONALD ET AL., SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, RESEARCH AND REALITY—A LITERATURE 
REVIEW ON DRAWING DOWN RETIREMENT FINANCIAL SAVINGS (2011), available at http:// 
www.soa.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=19866 (reviewing existing literature advising 
retirees on how to draw down their financial savings). 
80 See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Optimal Distribution Rules for Defined Contribution Plans: 
What Can the United States and Australia Learn from Other Countries?, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 3.03[2] (2012). 
81 Id. § 3.01.  
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last for 20 or 30 years.82 In that regard, financial planners often suggest 
following the so-called “4% rule.”83 The basic idea is to set spending at 4% of 
retirement savings and invest those savings in a portfolio with 50% stocks 
and 50% bonds.84 Each year thereafter, spending is increased to keep up 
with inflation. For example, assuming that an individual has a $1,000,000 
nest egg, in the first year of retirement she would withdraw 4% ($40,000), 
and each year thereafter that dollar amount would increase to keep up with 
inflation.85 Assuming a 3% annual inflation rate, annual withdrawals would 
increase to $41,200 in the second year, $42,436 in the third year, and so on. 
While there is a possibility of running out of money before death, many 
financial planners believe this strategy can usually work for 30 years. To 
minimize the prospect of outliving one’s nest egg in the recent economic 
recession, however, some financial advisors advised retirees to skip their 
scheduled inflation adjustments or to withdraw less than 4% of their new 
balances.86 
 
82 Id. § 3.03[4]. 
83 See William P. Bengen, Determining Withdrawal Rates Using Historical Data, J. FIN. PLAN., 
Oct. 1994, at 174-75 (explaining, using historical data, why retirees should withdraw no more than 
4% of their retirement savings each year); see also JANEMARIE MULVEY & PATRICK PURCELL, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40008, CONVERTING RETIREMENT SAVINGS INTO INCOME: 
ANNUITIES AND PERIODIC WITHDRAWALS 17 (2008) (“[A] large body of research on safe 
withdrawal rates for individuals has determined that a real withdrawal rate in the neighborhood of 
4 percent of the initial portfolio has a low chance of running out of money.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Benjamin Bridges, Robert Gesumaria & Michael V. Leonesio, Assessing the 
Performance of Life-Cycle Portfolio Allocation Strategies for Retirement Saving: A Simulation Study, SOC. 
SECURITY BULL., 2010, at 23 (examining the performance of life-cycle portfolio allocation 
strategies with varying exposure to stock and bond market risk based on observed historical U.S. 
asset returns). 
84 Bengen, supra note 83, at 175. 
85 This example is taken from Eleanor Laise, A Strategy for a Lifetime of Income, KIPLINGER 
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/krr-a-strategy-for-a-lifetime-of-income.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/DP7N-QK9Q. 
86 Id.; see also MICHAEL FINKE, WADE D. PFAU & DAVID M. BLANCHETT, THE 4 
PERCENT RULE IS NOT SAFE IN A LOW-YIELD WORLD (2013), available at 
http://wsisonline.com/papers_files/The%204%20Percent%20Rule.pdf (advising against the 4% 
rule); Kelly Greene, Say Goodbye to the 4% Rule, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2013, http:// 
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324162304578304491492559684, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/QA5Z-3HT3 (explaining that due to market forces eroding the value of retiree’s nest 
eggs, the 4% rule puts retirees at risk of running out of money); Eilene Zimmerman, 4% Rule for 
Retirement Withdrawals Is Golden No More, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/05/15/business/retirementspecial/the-4-rule-for-retirement-withdrawals-may-be-
outdated.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/YRQ9-32XV (“Many financial advisors are 
rejecting the 4 percent rule as out of touch with present realities.”). 
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2. Lifetime Annuities 
Traditional lifetime annuities can also provide lifetime retirement 
income.87 For example, for a 65-year-old man who purchased a $100,000 
immediate, level-payment annuity without inflation protection as of January 
1, 2014, the annual payout would be around $6864 or 6.86% of the annuity’s 
purchase price.88 Because women tend to live longer than men, the annual 
payout for a 65-year-old woman who elected an immediate, level-payment 
annuity as of January 1, 2014 would be only $6408, or 6.41% of the annuity’s 
purchase price.89 
With inflation-adjusted annuities, annual payouts would start lower but 
could end up higher. For example, if the hypothetical 65-year-old man 
instead chose an annuity stream with a 3% escalator, the annual payout for 
the first year would be just $5064.90 
3. Longevity Insurance 
Alternatively, retirees can protect against longevity risk by purchasing 
longevity insurance.91 The typical approach is to buy a “deferred annuity” at 
age 65 that starts making annual payments only if the annuitant lives past 
age 80 or 85. For example, in February 2012, a 65-year-old man could have 
invested $100,000 in a MetLife deferred annuity, and beginning at age 85, 
 
87 Farrell Dolan, Applying the 4-Box Strategy to Retirement Income Planning: Generating a 
Lifetime of Income, LIMRA’S MARKETFACTS Q., Fall 2009, at 84, 88, available at 
http://pjwalkercommunications.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Market-Facts.pdf (“This single 
product solution offers a high cash flow and income is guaranteed for life.”); Darla Mercado, 
Making the Case for Annuities, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 25, 2012, 12:01 AM), http:// 
www.investmentnews.com/article/20120325/REG/303259969/making-the-case-for-annuities, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ZZ6X-KFFU (explaining that annuities remain an attractive option 
despite changes in the economy reducing their returns). 
88 See Immediate Annuities Update, ANNUITY SHOPPER, Winter 2014, at 18 tbl.5, available at 
http://www.immediateannuities.com/pdfs/as/annuity-shopper-2014-01.pdf (showing average monthly 
payout for 65-year-old man of $572, a total of $6864 per year). 
89 Id. (showing average monthly payout for 65-year-old woman of $534, a total of $6408 per 
year). 
90 Id. (showing an average monthly payout for 65-year-old man with 3% cost of living 
adjustment of $422 in the first year of his retirement, for a total of $5064 for the first year). 
91 See Jason S. Scott, The Longevity Annuity: An Annuity for Everyone?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 43-44, available at http://corp.financialengines.com/employer/FE-
LongevityAnnuity-FAJ-08.pdf (explaining the advantages of longevity annuities as compared to 
immediate annuities); Anthony Webb, Guan Gong & Wei Sun, An Annuity that People Might 
Actually Buy 2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Working Paper No.  7-10, 2007), available at 
https://www2.bc.edu/~sunwc/paper/ib_7-10.pdf (discussing calculations of the value of longevity 
insurance). 
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he would receive a level lifetime income of $25,451.04 per year.92 Therefore, 
with a relatively small upfront investment, a retiree can secure an income 
stream that starts sometime in the future. The retiree can then use the rest 
of her savings to cover the fixed number of years until the year that the 
deferred annuity payments start.93 There is some risk of running out of 
money before the year that the deferred annuity starts, but that risk is 
certainly more manageable than trying to manage one’s retirement savings 
over the indefinite future.94 
4. Other Lifetime Income Products 
Retirees can also choose to purchase variable annuities with guaranteed 
lifetime withdrawal benefit (GLWB) funds to manage their longevity risk.95 
 
92 E-mail from Hersh Stern, WebAnnuities Ins. Agency, Inc., to Jonathan Barry Forman 
(Feb. 7, 2012, 11:46 EST) (on file with authors). Alternatively, that 65-year-old man could have 
purchased a deferred annuity that starts at age 80 and pays $17,069.40 per year; at age 75 and pays 
$11,649.84 per year; or at age 70 and pays $8133.60 per year. Id. Companies do not offer inflation-
adjusted deferred annuities, but some companies do offer fixed step-ups. Joseph A. Tomlinson, 
Income Choices, FIN. PLAN. (May 1, 2011), http://www.financial-planning.com/fp_issues/2011_5/ 
income-choices-2672801-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U35E-EXKR (comparing various 
investment strategies including systematic withdrawals, immediate annuities, deferred annuities, 
and guaranteed lifetime withdrawal benefits). 
93 See, e.g., Stephen C. Sexauer, Michael W. Peskin & Daniel Cassidy, Making Retirement 
Income Last a Lifetime, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 76-77 (proposing a “decumulation 
benchmark” that would use about 88% of retiree savings to purchase a laddered portfolio of 
Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities [TIPS] for the first 20 years and a deferred life annuity 
purchased with the remaining 12%); Rick Wurster, DC 20/20: Pathways to a Secure Retirement, 
ROTMAN INT’L J. PENSION MGMT., Fall 2011, at 54, 58 (suggesting that an annuity providing 
35% of real income replacement from age 85 would cost about 7.5% of a participant’s average 
account balance at retirement). 
94 Finally, it is worth noting that workers might be able to buy deferred annuities in 
installments, starting at a young age. For example, a worker could use a portion of her retirement 
savings each year to purchase a deferred annuity that starts at age 65, or at the advanced ages of 70, 
75, 80, 85, or even 90. Accordingly, this type of deferred annuity product could be used to provide 
retirement benefits that mimic the lifetime pensions provided by traditional defined benefit plans. 
See Moshe A. Milevsky, Real Longevity Insurance with a Deductible: Introduction to Advanced-Life 
Delayed Annuities (ALDA), N. AM. ACTUARIAL J., Oct. 2005, at 109, 111 (“[T]he [Advanced-Life 
Delayed Annuity] is preferable to a pure endowment policy that would (mature and) pay a lump 
sum at age 80, 85, or 90 since it would continue to provide periodic lifetime income regardless of 
how long the annuitant lived beyond the endowed age.”); see also Zorast Wadia, Longevity Risk & 
Retirement, ACTUARIAL DIG., Spring 2012, at 4, available at http://publications.milliman.com/ 
publications/eb-published/pdfs/longevity-risk-and-retirement.pdf (proposing a new retirement 
paradigm combining aspects of a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan). 
95 See Moshe A. Milevsky & Ling-wu Shao, Annuities and Their Derivatives: The Recent 
Canadian Experience (“[GLWB funds] provide savers with (some of) the retirement longevity 
protection of a traditional annuity, without forcing them to surrender upside potential or 
liquidity.”), in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS 
AND POLICY 50, 56 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama eds., 2011). 
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A GLWB is based on a variable annuity, but it allows investors to lock in a 
minimum guarantee for life.96 Similarly, so-called “standalone living 
benefits” are like GLWBs, except that instead of using a variable annuity 
chassis, standalone living benefits use mutual funds or managed accounts as 
the base.97  
II. TONTINE PENSIONS 
After analyzing the tontine principle, this Part discusses how to design a 
tontine fund, a tontine annuity, and finally, a tontine pension. 
A. The Tontine Principle 
In a simple tontine, members contribute equally to buy a portfolio of 
investments that is awarded entirely to the last surviving member.98 
Alternatively, each time a member of a tontine pool dies, her account 
balance could be divided among the surviving members of the pool.99 The 
latter type of tontine could be used to develop new financial products that 
would provide reliable, pension-like income for retirees. The key point is 
that variations on the tontine principle—that the share of each, at death, is 
enjoyed by the survivors—can be used to create a variety of attractive 
retirement income financial products.100 
 At the outset, imagine that 1000 65-year-old retirees each contribute 
$1000 to an investment fund that purchases a $1,000,000 Treasury bond 
paying 4% interest coupons.101 The bond will generate $40,000 in interest 
 
96 Mechanically, the investor or retiree deposits or rolls over a sum of money into a variable 
annuity with sub-accounts that are invested in a portfolio of stocks, bonds, and other generic 
investments. Depending on market performance, that investment portfolio grows or shrinks. In 
any event, at retirement, the annuitant begins taking guaranteed withdrawals from the account. 
Payouts come from the invested funds, but if those funds are ever depleted due to long life or poor 
investment returns, the guaranteed minimum kicks in. On the other hand, if the investment 
portfolio performs well, payouts can be increased. Tomlinson, supra note 92.  
97 Id. 
98 COOPER, supra note 9, at 1-2. 
99 Id. 
100 See, e.g., Ralph Goldsticker, A Mutual Fund to Yield Annuity-Like Benefits, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 63, 65 (describing alternative tontine structures, such as the pooling of assets 
from multiple tontine cohorts, investing assets in variable-income securities, and establishing 
inflation-adjusted payouts); Paul Newfield, The Tontine: An Improvement on the Conventional 
Annuity?, J. RETIREMENT, Winter 2014, at 37, 42 (delineating the advantages of tontines, or 
“pooled survival funds,” over traditional annuities, which include the lack of a contingency reserve 
requirement and a higher expected return). 
101 This example is derived from Moshe A. Milevsky, Want Financial Security? Look to the 
Renaissance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732453 
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per year, which will be split equally among the surviving participants. A 
custodian holds the bond and, because the custodian takes no risk and 
requires no capital, the custodian charges a trivial fee. Assuming that all of 
the investors live through the first year, they will each receive a $40 dividend 
from the fund ($40 = $40,000/1000). If only 800 of the original investors are 
alive a decade after the tontine started (when the survivors are 75), then 
each will receive a $50 dividend ($50 = $40,000/800). If only 100 investors 
are alive two decades after that (when the survivors are 95), then each will 
receive a $400 dividend ($400 = $40,000/100). Later, when only 40 investors 
remain, each will receive a $1000 dividend ($1000 = $40,000/40). If the terms 
of the tontine call for liquidation at that point, then each of the 40 survivors 
would also receive a liquidating distribution of $25,000 ($25,000 = 
$1,000,000/40). Alternatively, the tontine could be designed so that the last 
survivor receives the entire $1,000,000. 
Most retirees would likely prefer to have reasonably level benefits 
throughout their retirement years, rather than benefits that increase sharply 
at the very end of their lives. Accordingly, it would make sense to design 
tontine financial products with benefits that are level throughout retirement 
(like an immediate, level-payment annuity) or, alternatively, that increase 
gradually throughout retirement (like an immediate, inflation-adjusted 
annuity). Of particular note, unlike these commercial annuities—which 
must support insurance agent commissions and insurance company reserves, 
risk-taking, and profits—an early death in a tontine benefits only other 
investors, not some opportunistic insurance company. This limitation of 
benefits to investors should make tontines very popular.102 
B. A Tontine Fund 
Before explaining how the tontine principle can be used to create a 
tontine pension, this Section shows how the tontine principle can be used to 
 
2004578358110813542442.html?mod=ITP_journalreport_1, archived at http://perma.cc/RF7H-
5FU8. 
102 For example, Professor Suzanne Shu suggests that a tontine for one’s fellow firefighters 
will be perceived as fairer than the typical commercial annuity that they could buy from an 
insurance company: with a commercial annuity, an early death seems to benefit the insurance 
company, but with a tontine, an early death benefits fellow firefighters. SHLOMO BENARTZI, 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE POST-RETIREMENT CRISIS: A RESPONSE TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY/DEPARTMENT OF LABOR REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 
REGARDING LIFETIME INCOME OPTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES IN 
RETIREMENT PLANS 15 (2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB33-617.pdf. 
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create a tontine fund. The next Section explains how to create a tontine 
annuity.103 
We have already shown how a tontine fund could work for a group of 65-
year-old investors who all invested the same amount (i.e., $1000).104 This 
Section shows how to create a tontine fund that is fair to all investors, 
regardless of their age, gender, or the amount of their investments. 
In a simple tontine, when a member dies, the balance in her account 
(i.e., her contribution plus investment earnings) is distributed to the 
surviving members of the pool as “mortality gains.”105 Those forfeitures are 
divided equally among the survivors. Unfortunately, that approach results in 
an unfair situation because it favors younger members who are likely to live 
longer and receive more distributions. 
In a tontine fund with participants who have different ages, genders, and 
investment levels, the surviving members should not get equal portions of a 
dying member’s balance. Instead, the distributions should be made in 
unequal portions, carefully chosen to provide fair bets for all investors. In 
short, a tontine fund should be governed by a “fair transfer–plan” that 
accounts for each member’s life expectancy (i.e., death probability) and 
investment level.106 In this Section, we describe how such a tontine fund 
would be designed. 
1. A Fair Transfer–plan 
We can design a fair transfer–plan (FTP) to build a tontine fund that 
provides fair bets for all investors. The concept is straightforward: members 
join the tontine fund by contributing a desired amount, and each time a 
member dies, her contribution (and investment earnings) is distributed to 
the surviving members according to the FTP. New members may join at 
any time by making a contribution of a desired amount; however, no 
 
103 For background on tontine annuities, see, for example, Goldsticker, supra note 100; 
Milevsky & Salisbury, supra note 1; Michael J. Sabin, A Fast Bipartite Algorithm for Fair Tontines 
(May 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1848737; Sabin, 
supra note 15. 
104 See supra text accompanying note 101. 
105 Individuals who invest in annuity-like products have mortality gains and losses depending 
on when they die. Individuals who live longer than their peers get mortality gains from those who 
precede them, while individuals who die earlier than their peers suffer mortality losses. See David 
Blake, Annuity Markets: Problems and Solutions, 24 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 358, 371 (1999) 
(explaining that a mortality cross-subsidy “arises because some annuitants will die shortly after 
taking out an annuity thereby releasing a ‘mortality profit’ which insurance companies share with 
longer-surviving annuitants”). 
106 The term “fair transfer–plan” is derived from Sabin, supra note 15, at 5. 
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member may ever withdraw her contributions (or investment earnings).107 
Structured in this way, a tontine fund could operate into perpetuity. 
a. Tontine Funds Can Be Fair to Members of Different Ages 
Tontine funds can easily be designed to be fair to members of different 
ages. For example, Table 1 illustrates a tontine fund with just four members 
of different ages. To keep this example as simple as possible, we assume that 
each member (i) has contributed $1000 to the fund and that these 
contributions do not earn any interest.108 We use unisex life tables rather 
than gender-based life tables.109 For example, member 4 in Table 1 is an 80-
year-old who has a life expectancy (ei) of 8.95 years, and a 5.2% chance of 
dying before reaching age 81 (i.e., a death probability (qi) of 0.051906).  
 
Table 1: A Tontine Fund with Four Members of Different Ages, Unisex110 
 
Member 
(i) 
Age 
(xi) 
Life  
Expectancy 
(years) 
(ei)
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
Force-of-
Mortality 
Probability 
(fi)
Fair 
Transfer–
plan Weight 
(wi) 
1 65 18.88 0.013181 0.013269 0.053815 
2 70 15.22 0.020314 0.020523 0.086183 
3 75 11.89 0.032111 0.032638 0.146795 
4 80 8.95 0.051906 0.053302 0.713207 
 
Table 1 also shows a parameter known as the force-of-mortality probability 
( fi). Here is the logic: suppose that at time t a member of the pool dies. 
Pretend that we do not know which member has died at time t. The force-
of-mortality probabilities indicate the relative probability of death for each 
member of the pool. If, at the instant that a member died, one member has 
a force-of-mortality probability with a value f, and another has a value 2f, 
then the second member is twice as likely as the first to be the one who 
 
107 The situation is identical to a commercial annuity: once the premium is paid, there is no 
refund. 
108 That is, the underlying investments do not pay interest or dividends, nor are there any 
sales that result in gains or losses. We relax this assumption later in the paper. See infra subsection 
II.B.1.d. 
109 The life expectancies (ei) and death probabilities (qi) in Table 1 are derived from data 
provided to the authors by the Social Security Administration. E-mail from K. Mark Bye, Soc. 
Sec. Admin., to Jonathan Barry Forman (Nov. 12, 2013, 14:31 EST) (on file with authors). See infra 
Appendix Table 1 for a fuller version of the Social Security Administration 2009 unisex life table. 
110 Table 1 is drawn from Bye, supra note 109, and the authors’ computations. 
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died. In Table 1, for example, member 4 (our 80-year-old) has a relatively 
large force-of-mortality probability (0.053302), while member 1 (our 65-
year-old) has a relatively small force-of-mortality probability (0.013269). In 
short, member 4 is clearly the member who is the more likely of the two to 
have died at time t. Indeed, of the four members in Table 1, member 4 is the 
most likely to die next. These force-of-mortality probabilities (f i) are 
relatively easy to compute from the death probabilities (qi) in a mortality 
table.111  
Table 1 also shows another parameter, referred to as the “fair transfer–
plan weight” (wi). When a member of a tontine fund dies, she forfeits her 
entire contribution. Her contribution is then divided among the surviving 
members, with each surviving member receiving some fraction of the 
decedent’s account. For example, if member 4 (the 80-year-old) is, in fact, 
the member who died next, her $1000 contribution would be distributed to 
members 1, 2, and 3 based on their respective fair transfer–plan weights 
(wi). These fair transfer–plan weights (wi) are relatively easy to compute 
from the force-of-mortality probabilities ( fi).112 
 
111 The force-of-mortality probabilities in Table 1 were computed from the death probabilities 
(qi) in Column 4 of that table. See Sabin, supra note 15, at 10-12 (demonstrating how the force-of-
mortality method is interpolated from the probability of death during a given year).  
The explanation is as follows: at the outset, we make the simplifying assumption that the 
force of mortality is constant during each year of age. Next, suppose that the probability of dying 
during a specific year of age is 5%. Then, the probability of surviving the year is 1 - 0.05 = 95%. 
Now suppose the probability of surviving the first 6 months is 1 - 0.05/2 = 97.5%, and the 
probability of surviving the second 6 months is the same. Then, the probability of surviving the 
year is (0.975)2 = 95.063%. Now suppose the probability of surviving the first month is 1 - 0.05/12, 
and the same for the second month, third month, etc. Then, the probability of surviving the year is 
(1 - 0.05/12)12 = 95.113%. Generalizing this math, if the probability of surviving each of n periods 
within the year is 1 - 0.05/n, then the probability of surviving the year is (1 - 0.05/n)n. As n grows 
to infinity, the probability of surviving the year becomes e-.05= 95.123%, where e is Euler’s number 
(~2.71828). The probability of dying sometime during the year (i.e., the death probability) is 1 - 
0.95123 = 4.877%, and the force-of-mortality probability is 5%. 
Now, let us work it in reverse. Suppose the mortality table says that the death probability 
during a specific year is 5%. What is the force-of-mortality probability for the year? It is the value 
x that satisfies e-x = 1 - 0.05. The solution is x = -ln(1 - .05) = 5.129%, where “ln” is the natural 
logarithm. 
Accordingly, the force-of-mortality probabilities in Table 1 were computed from the death 
probabilities in Table 1 by using the formula,  fi = -ln(1 - qi ). For example, for member 4,  f4 = -ln(1 
- q4 ) = -ln(1 - 0.051906) = 0.053302. Of note, the force-of-mortality probabilities are fairly close in 
value to the death probabilities, except at older ages. See infra Appendix Table 1 (showing how the 
values in Columns 3 and 4 diverge as individuals live beyond age 100). 
112 The explanation is as follows: our goal is to design a fair transfer–plan, one that provides 
fair bets to all of the members. This means we want the expected return (ERi) received by each 
member i to be zero. Mathematically, we want 
 
0 = -fi si + ∑ j≠i fj sjwi/(1-wj ) for each member i, 
 
  
2015] Tontine Pensions 779 
 
More specifically, if member j dies, each surviving member i would 
receive some fraction of j’s $1000 contribution: the fraction that each 
member i would receive of member j’s contribution (sj) is equal to  
wi/(1 - wj), for i ≠ j. The fair transfer–plan weights (wi) are positive values 
that sum to 1, so the denominator (1 - wj) is the sum of all fair transfer–plan 
weights (wi) except that of member j. Meanwhile, member j would forfeit 
her entire $1000 contribution. 
Finally, we can use the fair transfer–plan weights to determine the 
amounts that each member i would receive when member j dies. For 
example, if member 4 (the 80-year-old) dies, then member 1 (the 65-year-
old) would receive $187.64 = $1000 × w1/(1 - w4) = $1000 × 0.053815/(1 - 
0.713207); member 2 (the 70-year-old) would receive $300.51 = $1000 × w2/(1 
- w4) = $1000 × 0.086183/(1 - 0.713207); member 3 (the 75-year-old) would 
receive $511.85 = $1000 × w3/(1 - w4) = $1000 × 0.146795/(1 - 0.713207); and, of 
course, member 4 would forfeit her $1000.113 We call the distributions to 
members 1, 2, and 3 “mortality-gain distributions”; meanwhile, member 4 
has a mortality loss.114 
 
 
where: fi is the force-of-mortality probability of member i, si is the contribution made by member 
i, and wi is the fair transfer–plan weight for member i that we need to provide fair bets. See Sabin, 
A Fast Bipartite Algorithm for Fair Tontines, supra note 103, at 7-8 (explaining the underlying 
algorithm). 
The formula above gives us a set of m equations, one equation for each member i. The 
solution to those equations is unique, meaning there is only one set of fair transfer–plan weights 
(wi) that solve those equations. The challenging part is that the equations are not linear because, in 
each equation, one unknown, wi, is divided by another unknown, (1 - wj). That means we cannot 
solve the equations using the standard methods of linear algebra. Fortunately, however, we are able 
to solve these equations by using an iterative method designed specifically for them. More 
specifically, the iterative method uses a bisection algorithm. See id. at 12-13 (demonstrating the 
bisection algorithm method). While the explanation of how to create the computer program to 
solve that algorithm is too involved to explain here, we can easily show that the method works, as 
the fair transfer–plan weights (wi) in Table 1 do solve the pertinent equations. For example, for i = 
3, ER3 = 0: 
 
- 0.032638 × $1000= -32.638 
+ 0.013269 × $1000 × 0.146795/(1 - 0.053815)= 2.059 
+ 0.020523 × $1000 × 0.146795/(1 - 0.086183)= 3.297 
+ 0.053302 × $1000 × 0.146795/(1 - 0.713207)= 27.283 
= 0 
 
We can verify that similar equations for i = 1, 2, and 4 also work. Therefore, we can be certain that 
the fair transfer–plan weights (wi) in Table 1 accomplish our goal for a fair transfer–plan (i.e., ERi 
= 0). 
113 Checking our answer, $187.64 + $300.51 + $511.85 = $1000. 
114 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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In short, a tontine fund can fairly accommodate members of different 
ages. The key is to design a fair transfer–plan that uses each member’s 
death probability (qi) to determine her force-of-mortality probability ( fi) 
and her fair transfer–plan weight (wi). The result is a tontine investment 
fund that offers a fair bet to all members. It is worth noting that the itera-
tive method used to determine the fair transfer–plan weights (wi) is fast and 
could easily handle large tontine funds involving millions of members. 
b. Tontine Funds Can Be Fair to Both Men and Women 
Tontines can also be designed to take gender into account.115 Women 
tend to live longer than men and have lower death probabilities than same-
aged men.116 For example, Table 2 shows that the life expectancy (ei) for a 
65-year-old man in 2009 was 17.51 years, and his death probability (qi) was 
0.016182; meanwhile, the life expectancy (ei) of a 65-year-old woman that 
year was 20.19 years and her death probability (qi) was 0.010298.117 Compare 
those numbers with their 18.88-year unisex life expectancy (ei) and their 
0.013181 unisex death probability (qi) shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 2: A Tontine Fund with Four Members, Gender-Based118 
 
Member 
(i) 
Age 
(xi) 
Gender Life  
Expectancy
(years) 
(ei) 
Death 
Probability
(qi) 
Force-of-
Mortality 
Probability 
(fi) 
Fair Transfer–plan 
Weight 
(wi) 
1 65 male 17.51 0.016182 0.016314 0.330931 
2 65 male 17.51 0.016182 0.016314 0.330931 
3 65 female 20.19 0.010298 0.010351 0.169069 
4 65 female 20.19 0.010298 0.010351 0.169069 
 
A tontine fund can take gender into account by using gender-based 
death probabilities (qi) rather than unisex death probabilities. For example, 
Table 2 illustrates a tontine fund with two men and two women. For 
simplicity, we assume that all the members of this tontine fund are age 65, 
 
115 See, e.g., Sabin, supra note 15, at 14-16 (providing an example of a tontine that could be fair 
regardless of the participants’ gender). 
116 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 21. 
117 The life expectancies (ei) and death probabilities (qi) in Table 2 are derived from data 
provided to the authors by the Social Security Administration. E-mail from K. Mark Bye, Soc. 
Sec. Admin., to Jonathan Barry Forman (Dec. 3, 2014, 10:03 EST) (on file with authors). 
118 Table 2 is drawn from Bye, supra note 117, and the authors’ computations. 
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that each contributed $1000 to the fund, and that their contributions do not 
earn any interest. However, as the previous subsection showed, a tontine 
fund could easily accommodate members of different ages, as well. 
Assuming that member 4 (a female) dies, then members 1 and 2 (the 
males) would each receive a mortality-gain distribution of $398.27 ($398.27 = 
$1000 × w1(or 2)/(1 - w4) = $1000 × 0.330931/(1 - 0.169069)); member 3 (the 
other female) would receive a mortality-gain distribution of just $203.47 
($203.47 = $1000 × w3/(1 - w4) = $1000 × 0.169069/(1 - 0.169069)); and, of 
course, member 4 would forfeit her $1000 balance (a mortality loss of 
$1000).119 On the other hand, if these mortality-gain distributions had 
instead been determined under a unisex mortality table, it is easy to see that 
when one member dies each survivor would get one-third, $333.33 ($333.33 = 
$1000 × wi/(1 - wj) = $1000 × 0.25/(1 - 0.25)). Based on this comparison, the 
female members would appear to be short-changed if a tontine fund used a 
gender-based life expectancy table; however, remember that the 65-year-old 
females in any tontine fund are likely to live longer and receive more 
mortality-gain distributions than their 65-year-old brethren. All in all, the 
expected returns for both men and women would be equal, and both 
genders would get fair returns on their $1000 investments (i.e., fair bets).120 
Implicitly, since gender-based tontine funds would be fair to both women 
and men, unisex tontine funds must be “unfair” to one gender. In fact, 
unisex tontine funds would be unfair to men in precisely the same way that 
unisex commercial annuities are “unfair” to men: the annual distributions 
would be identical for men and women with a unisex tontine fund (or 
unisex annuity), but women tend to live longer and would likely collect 
more money from unisex tontine funds (and unisex annuities) than men. 
The bottom line is that women would generally fare better than men in any 
tontine fund that used unisex life tables. Accordingly, to attract both male 
and female investors, the free market would force tontine funds to take 
gender into account in their design (i.e., use gender-based, not unisex, life 
tables), just as the free market today already forces insurance companies to 
take gender into account when they sell annuities.121 
In short, a tontine fund can fairly accommodate members of different 
genders by using gender-based life tables rather than unisex life tables. 
 
119 Checking our answer, $398.27 + $398.27 + $203.47 = $1000.01 (error due to rounding). 
120 That is, ERi = 0 for both women and men. 
121 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. We have much more to say about gender 
issues later in this Article. See infra Section V.D; see also Mary L. Heen, Nondiscrimination in 
Insurance: The Next Chapter, 49 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 61) (on file with 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (arguing that gender discrimination laws should be 
expanded to prevent insurance companies from selling gender-based annuities). 
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c. Tontines Can Fairly Accommodate Members with Differing Levels of Contribution 
Tontine funds can also allow members to make differing levels of 
contributions. For example, Table 3 illustrates a tontine fund with four 
members with different contribution levels (si). For simplicity, all of the 
members of this tontine fund are 65-year-old men (and contributions do not 
earn any interest), although as the previous subsections have shown, a 
tontine fund can easily accommodate members of different ages and 
genders. 
 
Table 3: A Tontine Fund with Four Members, Different Levels of Contribution122 
 
Member 
(i) 
Age 
(xi ) 
Contribution 
(si ) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(years) 
(ei)
Death 
Probability 
(qi ) 
Force-of-
Mortality 
Probability 
( fi)
Fair Transfer–
plan Weight 
(wi ) 
1 65 $1000 17.51 0.016182 0.016314 0.066510 
2 65 $2000 17.51 0.016182 0.016314 0.145278 
3 65 $3000 17.51 0.016182 0.016314 0.247530 
4 65 $4000 17.51 0.016182 0.016314 0.540682 
 
Mathematically, if the dying member is member j, then each surviving 
member i would receive a mortality-gain distribution equal to sjwi/(1 - wj), 
for i ≠ j. For example, assuming that member 4 (the $4000 contributor) dies, 
then member 1 (the $1000 contributor) would receive a mortality-gain 
distribution of $579.21 ($579.21 = s4w1/(1 - w4) = $4000 × 0.06651/(1 - 
0.540682)); member 2 (the $2,000 contributor) would receive a mortality-
gain distribution of $1265.16 ($1265.16 = s4w2/(1 - w4) = $4000 × 0.145278/(1 - 
0.540682)); member 3 (the $3000 contributor) would receive a mortality-
gain distribution of $2155.63 ($2155.63 = s4w3/(1 - w4) = $4000 × 0.247530/(1 - 
0.540682)); and, of course, member 4 would forfeit his $4000 balance (a 
mortality loss of $ 4000).123 
 
122 Table 3 is drawn from Bye, supra note 117, and authors’ computations. 
123 Checking our answer, $579.21 + $1265.16 + $2155.63 = $4000. 
Intuitively, some readers may be wondering why, for example, member 2 (the $2000 contributor) 
would get more than twice as much as member 1 (the $1000 contributor). Asked differently, some 
readers may be wondering why member 2’s fair transfer–plan weight (w2), 0.145278, would be more 
than twice as much as member 1’s fair transfer–plan weight (w1), 0.066510. 
Here, a slightly different example can help. Imagine a tontine fund with four otherwise 
identical 65-year-old men, except that while members 1, 2, and 3 each contribute $1000 to the 
tontine fund, member 4 contributes $3000. Now assume that member 1 dies, leaving members 2, 3, 
and 4 alive. Intuitively, it might seem that member 1’s $1000 contribution should be divided in 
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A tontine fund can fairly accommodate members with differing levels of 
contributions by using fair transfer–plan weights (wi) that take into account 
those different levels of contributions. There is one caveat, however: no one 
member can own more than half of the total risk of a tontine fund. 
Otherwise, the tontine fund could not provide that person with a fair bet 
for surviving the rest.124 
d. Tontine Funds Can Properly Account for Investment Earnings 
In the simple tontine funds that we have considered so far, we have 
assumed that contributions do not earn any interest. In the real world, 
however, each member’s contributions would be invested, and each 
member’s balance would grow (or shrink) according to its investment 
performance. As members of a tontine fund die, mortality-gain distribu-
tions are based on the balance in each member’s account at the time of 
death. 
We continue to use the variable si (which we have used so far only to 
signify member contributions) to denote the balance in member i’s account 
at any time t; and, again, if the dying member is member j, then each 
surviving member i would receive a mortality-gain distribution equal to 
sjwi/(1 - wj), for i ≠ j. If the pool of tontine fund investors is large, then the 
deaths of members would occur relatively often, and each survivor would 
receive frequent payments of mortality-gain distributions that would 
continue until her own death. 
 
proportion to the relative contributions (si) of members 2, 3, and 4, in which case member 2 (s2 = 
$1000) and member 3 (s3 = $1000) would each get $200, one-fifth of dying member 1’s $1000 
contribution ($200 = $1000 × $1000/($1000 + $1000 + $3000)), while member 4 (s4 = $3000) would 
get $600, or three-fifths ($600 = $1000 × $3000/($1000 + $1000 + $3000)). In fact, however, member 
4 must get 100% of dying member 1’s contribution, and he must also get 100% of member 2’s 
contribution or 100% of member 3’s contribution if either of them is the one who dies. Otherwise, 
member 4’s expected return from the investment would be less than zero. After all, if member 4 
dies, he will lose his entire $3000 contribution; therefore, in effect, he must get 100% of the 
contributions of any other member who dies. 
In short, all other things being equal, members who make larger contributions to a tontine 
fund must get disproportionately higher mortality-gain distributions from the fund in order to 
receive a fair bet. The fair transfer–plan weights (wi) do the work. That is why, in Table 3, member 
2’s fair transfer–plan weight (s2 = $2000; w2 = 0.145278), is more than twice as much as member 1’s 
fair transfer–plan weight (s1 = $1000; w1 = 0.066510). 
124 Here, a member’s risk means the product fi si of his force-of-mortality probability ( fi) 
multiplied by his contribution (si), and the total risk means the sum of all members’ risks. See 
Sabin, supra note 15, at 14 (“[A]n FTP exists if and only if no member holds more than half of the 
total risk of the pool.”). Additional rules may be imposed that limit the total amount that a 
member may contribute. Id. 
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Again, no member would ever be allowed to take any other distributions 
(i.e., no voluntary withdrawals).125 Once a contribution is made, it would 
remain in the tontine fund forever, along with any investment earnings. At 
the member’s death, the balance in the account would be distributed to the 
surviving members as mortality-gain distributions. This restriction is 
necessary because a member in failing health would otherwise seek to 
withdraw her contributions and the earnings on those contributions. Such 
“adverse selection” would invalidate the assumptions of the mortality table 
used to compute the fair transfer–plan weights (wi). 
e. Tontine Funds Could Also Take Increasing Longevity into Account 
Finally, in the simple tontine funds we have considered so far, we have 
used the Social Security Administration’s 2009 life tables.126 Over time, 
however, life expectancies are likely to increase, and these 2009 life tables 
will soon be out-of-date.127 Consequently, a real-world tontine fund should 
be designed to use the latest life tables so that it can make mortality-gain 
distributions based on the most recent death probability estimates.128 
2. Expected Benefits of Tontine Funds 
We have shown the ease of designing a tontine fund that is fair to 
members of differing ages, genders, and contribution levels. To be sure, 
those who survive the longest would get better than average returns (i.e., 
mortality gains), while those who die young might not even recover their 
initial investments (i.e., mortality losses). On average, however, each 
member could expect to recover her initial contribution and any returns on 
that investment (less a modest management and recordkeeping fee).  
 Figure 1 shows a computer simulation of how a tontine fund with 
around 220 members might work.129 This simulation was designed by 
creating a tontine fund in which one new member joins each month. Each 
 
125 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra Tables 1 & 2 (using the Social Security Administration’s 2009 unisex and 
gender-based life tables, respectively). 
127 FELICITIE C. BELL & MICHAEL L. MILLER, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., LIFE TABLES FOR 
THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY AREA 1900-2100, at 14 fig.4a (2005), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_studies/study120.pdf; Jonathan Barry Forman & Yung-Ping 
(Bing) Chen, Optimal Retirement Age, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF BENEFITS AND 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 14.02 (2008) (outlining the effect of increased life expectancy on 
current pension plans). 
128 As a legal matter, the tontine fund agreement would need to specify how and when it 
would choose a new life table for use in its fair transfer–plan. 
129 See Sabin, supra note 15, at 24-25 (illustrating such a simulation). 
  
2015] Tontine Pensions 785 
 
new member’s gender was randomly selected, equiprobably male or female; 
each new member’s age was exactly 65; that is, his or her 65th birthday 
coincided with the joining date; and each member’s contribution was a 
randomly selected amount between $100 and $100,000. The number of 
members grows for several decades until it reaches an equilibrium of about 
220 members, where, on average, one member dies each month, offsetting 
the new member who joins each month. Figure 1 shows the mortality gains 
that a typical long-lived male could expect after that equilibrium has been 
reached. 
 
 
Figure 1: Normalized Mortality Gain from FTPs Versus Age for a Typical 
Long-Lived Male Member in a Simulated Tontine Fund130 
 
 
 
More specifically, Figure 1 plots the mortality-gain distributions paid to 
one of the longer-lived male members in the simulation (normalized to a 
contribution of $1). The plot began at the member’s joining age, age 65, and 
 
130 Id. at 25 fig. 5. 
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ended at the time of his death. As the plot shows, benefits would be 
received at random times (i.e., when other members died) and in random 
amounts (i.e., varying with the contributions of the dying member). The 
average value of his benefit would increase with age, since the member’s 
own death probability (qi) and, consequently, his fair transfer–plan weight 
(wi) would increase with his age. In fact, it can be shown that the average 
value of a tontine fund member’s benefit depends only on that member’s age 
and gender (for qi) and that member’s contribution (si): the ages, genders, 
and contribution amounts of other members do not affect that member’s 
average benefit.131 
3. Two Problems with Tontine Funds 
Two features of the tontine fund in Figure 1 stand out as serious 
negatives. First, mortality-gain distributions vary dramatically both in 
amount and timing, because they depend on when members die and how 
much those dying members had contributed. In short, payouts are noisy. 
Second, a member’s mortality-gain distributions start slow and low but 
increase rather dramatically at advanced ages, as the member’s death 
probability (qi) increases with age. In short, payouts are backloaded. 
While the tontine fund always provides a fair bet to investors, these two 
disadvantages will discourage retirees from investing in them because, 
presumably, most retirees would prefer to have benefits that are level 
throughout retirement (like an immediate, level-payment annuity) or, 
alternatively, that increase gradually throughout retirement (like an 
immediate, inflation-adjusted annuity). 
a. Reducing the Noisiness of a Tontine Fund 
The noisiness of a tontine fund can be reduced by accumulating mortality-
gain distributions over some period (e.g., a month), rather than paying 
them at the time of each member’s death, and by increasing the number of 
investors in the tontine fund. First, for example, a tontine fund can be 
designed to make monthly mortality-gain distributions as follows: 
 Each member has an individual account that holds his contribution; 
 
131 See id. at 5 (noting that, in a fair tontine, “a surviving member’s expected payout does not 
depend on the number of members in the pool, or the ages, genders, or contributions of the other 
members”). 
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 When a member dies, the balance in his account is distributed 
to the accounts of the surviving members based on their respec-
tive fair transfer–plan weights (wi); and 
 At end of each month, each living member receives a monthly 
mortality-gain distribution equal to the excess of the balance in his 
account over the amount of his initial contribution. 
Second, increasing the number of members in a tontine fund would 
further decrease the noisiness of payouts. For example, imagine a tontine 
fund with approximately 5000 members of varying ages and genders who 
have made varying contributions. Again, for simplicity, assume that contri-
butions do not earn interest. Table 4 shows a sample monthly statement for 
a member who had contributed $250,000 to a tontine fund and who lived 
through the month. More specifically, Table 4 shows that this member 
received a single distribution of $1041.67 at the end of the month, rather 
than varying amounts throughout the month (ranging from a low of $0 on 
most days to a high of $184.32 on April 7).132 In short, the noisiness of this 
tontine fund would be reduced through (1) making monthly mortality-gain 
distributions (rather than as each death occurs) and (2) having a large 
number of members in the pool (approximately 5000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 In this example, two other members died on April 7, and this hypothetical member had 
$184.32 credited to her account ($184.32 = $135.41 + $48.91). 
  
788 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 755 
 
Table 4: Sample Monthly Tontine Fund Statement for a Living Member133 
 
Date Amount ($) Balance ($) Description 
03/31  250,000.00
04/02 67.17 250,067.17 Proceeds from FTP 
04/03 25.21 250,092.38 Proceeds from FTP 
04/05 55.14 250,147.52 Proceeds from FTP 
04/07 135.41 250,282.93 Proceeds from FTP 
04/07 48.91 250,331.84 Proceeds from FTP 
04/12 52.29 250,384.13 Proceeds from FTP 
04/15 102.54 250,486.67 Proceeds from FTP 
04/20 159.46 250,649.13 Proceeds from FTP 
04/21 139.68 250,785.82 Proceeds from FTP 
04/22 17.82 250,803.63 Proceeds from FTP 
04/25 124.81 250,928.44 Proceeds from FTP 
04/28 55.32 250,983.76 Proceeds from FTP 
04/30 57.91 251,041.67 Proceeds from FTP 
04/30 (1041.67) 250,000.00 Payout of FTP Proceeds 
 
In contrast, Table 5 shows the sample monthly statement for another 
member who is the same age and gender and contributed the same amount 
as the member in Table 4 but who died during the month. When she died 
on April 12, she forfeited the balance in her account on that date, and it was 
divided among the surviving members of the tontine fund (i.e., with the 
surviving member in Table 4 receiving $52.29 of the account on that 
date).134 
 
 
 
 
 
133 This hypothetical tontine fund has approximately 5000 members of varying ages and 
genders who have made varying contributions. Mortality gains are based on a fair transfer–plan, 
and surviving members get a single payout at the end of the month. 
134 In the real world, it would certainly take some time for the tontine fund manager to 
discover and record deaths and to compute the resulting mortality gains. Accordingly, actual 
monthly mortality-gain distributions might be delayed for a month or two. It would be more 
accurate to say that the surviving member in Table 4 is entitled to, and will eventually receive, the 
$52.29 attributable to the April 12th death of the member whose account is shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Sample Monthly Tontine Fund Statement for a Member Who Dies 
During the Month135 
 
Date Amount($) Balance ($) Description 
03/31  250,000.00  
04/02 67.17 250,067.17 Proceeds from FTP 
04/03 25.21 250,092.38 Proceeds from FTP 
04/05 55.14 250,147.52 Proceeds from FTP 
04/07 135.41 250,282.93 Proceeds from FTP 
04/07 48.91 250,331.84 Proceeds from FTP 
04/12 (250,331.84) 0 Forfeited to FTP 
 
Unfortunately, accumulating mortality-gains for monthly mortality-gain 
distributions and increasing the number of members in the tontine fund 
would do nothing to counteract the volatility that would invariably result 
from fluctuations in the value of the underlying investment assets. For 
example, if all of the tontine fund assets were invested in equities, then 
average monthly mortality-gain distributions could fall from, for example, 
$1000 a month for a typical member when the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
hit 14,000 (i.e., in October of 2007) to just $500 a month when the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average fell to 7000 (i.e., in February of 2009).136 
To be sure, market fluctuations also play havoc with the prices and yields 
of traditional annuities and variable annuities that could be purchased by a 
retiree or by a pension plan. For example, if the market is down when a 
retiree decides to buy an annuity, she will only be able to buy a smaller 
annuity. Similarly, if interest rates are low when she decides to buy an 
annuity, the lifetime income stream that she purchases will also be low.137 
Variable annuity payouts also vary with the performance of the underlying 
assets.138 
 
135 This hypothetical tontine fund has approximately 5000 members of varying ages and 
genders who have made varying contributions. Mortality gains are based on a fair transfer–plan, 
surviving members get a single payout at the end of the month, and dying members forfeit the 
balance in their accounts on the date of death. 
136 Dow Jones Industrial Average, supra note 54. Monthly mortality-gain distributions would 
also fluctuate with changes in the dividend and interest yields on the underlying assets. 
137 The Dangers of Buying an Annuity When Interest Rates Are Low, supra note 55. 
138 See Marotta, supra note 56 and accompanying text. We will further discuss how tontine 
financial products can help investors deal with market volatility in Section V.C, infra. 
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b. Reducing Backloading in a Tontine Fund 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to reduce the backloading that is inherent 
in a tontine fund. The longer a member lives, the more she would recieve, as 
her monthly mortality-gain distributions would generally increase with her 
age and her increasing death probability (qi).139 In the next Section, 
however, we will discuss how this backloading problem can be solved by 
adding an “annuity-payback mechanism.” The annuity-payback mechanism 
has the added benefit of further reducing the noisiness of the payouts. We 
call the resulting product a “tontine annuity.” 
C. A Tontine Annuity 
In this Section, we propose a tontine annuity that closely resembles a 
variable annuity. A tontine annuity is constructed by adding two 
enhancements to a tontine fund. First, as already discussed, to reduce 
noisiness, we would build in a monthly payment period; and, second, to 
eliminate backloading, we would add an annuity-payback mechanism. 
1. Monthly Accrual of Fair Transfer–plan Payouts 
In a tontine annuity, mortality-gain distributions would not be paid out 
immediately when other members die. Instead, mortality-gain distributions 
would be accrued within the individual accounts of the surviving members. 
If a member is alive at the end of the month, she would be paid the accrued 
mortality-gain distributions in her account as a monthly mortality-gain 
distribution (e.g., see Table 4). If she is not alive at the end of the month, 
she would receive nothing, as the balance in her account, including any 
mortality-gain distributions that accrued that month, would have been 
distributed to surviving members when she died during the month (e.g., see 
Table 5). Thus, a member would receive payments on a monthly schedule 
just as she would if she had instead purchased a variable annuity from an 
insurance company.  
2. Annuity Payback 
In addition to receiving a monthly mortality-gain distribution, each 
surviving member would also receive a portion of her original contribution 
at the end of each month that she is alive. Our approach is to make “monthly 
tontine-annuity distributions” to surviving members that are designed to 
 
139 See Sabin, supra note 15, at 22-26; infra subsection II.C.2. 
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cancel out the age-related increase in mortality-gain distributions inherent 
in simple tontine funds like the one in Figure 1 (i.e., the backloading). 
It turns out that a tontine annuity constructed in this way closely 
resembles an actuarially fair variable annuity (i.e., one without insurance 
agent commissions or insurance company reserves, risk-taking, and profits). 
To be sure, because the value of the assets in the tontine annuity fluctuates, 
monthly tontine–annuity distributions would still be volatile. But if we 
pretend that the underlying investment assets grow at a fixed, assumed rate 
of return, then the tontine annuity would provide monthly payouts that are 
approximately constant for life. 
Moreover, it is relatively easy to determine the proper amounts of these 
monthly tontine-annuity distributions. The monthly payout of any 
actuarially fair annuity is simply equal to the account balance divided by a 
monthly annuity factor. The monthly annuity factor is the premium for an 
actuarially fair annuity that pays $1 per month for life. These monthly 
annuity factors can easily be calculated from a mortality table and depend 
only on the age of the annuitant and the assumed interest rate.140 
 
140 This footnote explains how to compute a yearly annuity factor, which is the actuarial 
present value of a life annuity that pays $1 each year for life. The monthly annuity factor is 
approximately 12 times the yearly annuity factor. 
We compute the annuity factor at each birthday by working backwards from the terminal age 
of the mortality table. For the 2009 Social Security Administration table that we use (see infra 
Appendix Table 1), the last entry is for age 119; thus the terminal age is 120, meaning that the table 
implies an individual always dies before her 121st birthday.  
If the individual is alive at birthday 120, she receives $1. Since she does not survive to birthday 
121, the only payment she receives is the single dollar at age 120, so the actuarial present value of 
the annuity is $1. Thus: 
a120 = 1. 
 If the individual is alive at birthday 119, she receives $1. In addition, if she survives to birthday 
120, she will receive a future payment stream having an actuarial value of a120. Thus, at birthday 
119, the actuarial present value of payments is 
a119 = 1 + (1 - q119 ) × a120 /(1 + d), 
where: q119 is the probability of dying during age 119 (i.e., before birthday 120), which is given in 
the mortality table; and d is the discount rate (e.g., d = .07, or 7%). 
 
Similarly, if the individual is alive at birthday 118, she receives $1, and if she survives to birthday 
119, she will receive a future payment stream having an actuarial value of a119. Thus, at birthday 118, 
the actuarial value of payments is: 
a118 = 1 + (1 - q118) × a119 /(1 + d). 
Continuing in this manner, we calculate the annuity factor a117 for birthday 117, a116 for 
birthday 116, and so on, until we reach the birthday of interest. For example, for the 2009 Social 
Security Administration table and a discount rate of 7%, continuing until birthday 65 gives a65 = 
10.359. (That is, the actuarial present value of an annuity that pays $1 each year for the life of a 
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For example, Table 6 shows a sample monthly statement for a member 
of a tontine annuity who lives through the first month after turning age 65 
and who had exactly $250,000 in his account at the end of the prior month. 
The only difference between the monthly statement in Table 4 and the 
monthly statement in Table 6 is that instead of receiving a monthly mortality-
gain distribution of just $1041.67 (as in Table 4), our hypothetical member 
would receive a monthly tontine-annuity distribution of $2133. That $2133 is 
computed by dividing the account balance on the last day of the month (i.e., 
$251,041.67 on April 30th) by the applicable monthly annuity factor (i.e., 
117.6939).141 That is, the monthly tontine-annuity distribution for the just-
turned-65-year-old member in Table 6 is $2133 ($2133.00 = 
$251,041.67/117.6939). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65-year-old is $10.36 (at a 7% discount rate).) As mentioned, the monthly annuity factor is 
approximately 12 times the yearly annuity factor, and Column 5 of Appendix Table 1, infra, shows 
that the monthly annuity factor for the first month of the year in which our hypothetical retiree 
turns 65 is 117.6939, or about 12 × 10.359. 
141 Column 5 of Appendix Table 1, infra, shows the applicable monthly annuity factors for the 
first month of each year starting with age 65, when monthly tontine-annuity distributions are 
expected to commence. 
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Table 6: Sample Monthly Tontine Annuity Statement for a Living Member 
(for the First Month After the Member Turned 65)142 
 
Date Amount Balance Description
03/31  250,000.00  
04/02 67.17 250,067.17 Proceeds from FTP 
04/03 25.21 250,092.38 Proceeds from FTP 
04/05 55.14 250,147.52 Proceeds from FTP 
04/07 135.41 250,282.93 Proceeds from FTP 
04/07 48.91 250,331.84 Proceeds from FTP 
04/12 52.29 250,384.13 Proceeds from FTP 
04/15 102.54 250,486.67 Proceeds from FTP 
04/20 159.46 250,649.13 Proceeds from FTP 
04/21 139.68 250,785.82 Proceeds from FTP 
04/22 17.82 250,803.63 Proceeds from FTP 
04/25 124.81 250,928.44 Proceeds from FTP 
04/28 55.32 250,983.76 Proceeds from FTP 
04/30 57.91 251,041.67 Proceeds from FTP 
04/30 (2133.00) 248,908.67 Tontine-annuity Distribution 
 
Alternatively, a tontine annuity could be designed to make monthly 
tontine-annuity distributions that mimic an inflation-adjusted variable 
annuity. That inflation-adjusted tontine annuity would make lower monthly 
tontine-annuity distributions in the early years but greater distributions for 
those who live to later years. For example, if inflation is assumed to be 3% 
per year, then the first monthly tontine-annuity distribution for the hypothetical 
65-year-old in Table 6 would be just $1651.72 ($1651.72 = 
$251,041.67/151.9876),143 but distributions in subsequent months would be 
 
142 This hypothetical tontine annuity has approximately 5000 members of varying ages and 
genders who have made varying contributions. Mortality gains are based on a fair transfer–plan, 
and surviving members get a single payout at the end of the month, based on the applicable 
monthly annuity factor. 
143 Column 6 of Appendix Table 1, infra, shows the inflation-adjusted applicable monthly 
annuity factors for the first month of each year starting with age 65, when monthly tontine-
annuity distributions are expected to commence. 
This footnote explains how to compute a yearly inflation-adjusted annuity factor, which is the 
actuarial present value of a life annuity that pays $1 the first year and then increases future annual 
payments by the assumed inflation rate. The monthly annuity factor is approximately 12 times the 
yearly annuity factor. 
The annuity factor is computed in a manner similar to the uniform case in note 140, supra, 
except that now it includes the inflation adjustment. Letting i denote the inflation rate (e.g., i = 
.03 or 3%), then: 
 
  
794 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 755 
 
larger and would eventually exceed the payout level of the not-adjusted-for-
inflation tontine annuity. 
In short, a tontine annuity could be designed to resemble an actuarially 
fair variable annuity or an actuarially fair inflation-adjusted variable annuity. 
These tontine annuities would still be volatile because of fluctuations in the 
value of the underlying investment assets, but backloading would be 
eliminated. 
3. Adding in Investment Income 
In the simple tontine annuities we have considered so far, we have 
assumed that contributions do not earn any interest. In the real world, 
however, each member’s contributions would be invested, and the member’s 
balance would grow (or shrink) according to its investment performance. 
Accordingly, account balances at the end of each month would tend to be 
higher, and monthly tontine-annuity distributions would also tend to be 
higher. For example, if the tontine annuity in Table 6 had earned $1000 of 
investment interest in that month, the balance in the account at the end of 
the month would have been $1000 higher, and, consequently, the monthly 
tontine distribution would have been $8.52 higher—$2141.52 instead of the 
$2133, as shown in Table 6 ($2141.52 = $252,041.67/117.6939).144  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a120 = 1, 
a119 = 1 + (1 + i) × (1 - q119) × a120 /(1 + d), 
a118 = 1 + (1 + i) × (1 - q118) × a119 /(1 + d), 
and so forth. For example, we can show that if the inflation parameter is set to 3%, then a65 = 13.216. 
As mentioned, the monthly annuity factor is approximately 12 times the yearly annuity factor, 
and Column 6 of Appendix Table 1, infra, shows that the inflation-adjusted monthly annuity factor 
for the first month of the year in which our hypothetical retiree turns 65 is 151.9876, or about 12 × 13.216. 
144 See infra Table 7. 
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Table 7: Sample Monthly Tontine Annuity Statement for a Living Member, 
with Investment Earnings (for the First Month 
 After the Member Turned 65)145 
 
Date Amount Balance Description 
03/31  250,000.00  
04/02 67.17 250,067.17 Proceeds from FTP 
04/03 25.21 250,092.38 Proceeds from FTP 
04/05 55.14 250,147.52 Proceeds from FTP 
04/07 135.41 250,282.93 Proceeds from FTP 
04/07 48.91 250,331.84 Proceeds from FTP 
04/12 52.29 250,384.13 Proceeds from FTP 
04/15 102.54 250,486.67 Proceeds from FTP 
04/20 159.46 250,649.13 Proceeds from FTP 
04/21 139.68 250,785.82 Proceeds from FTP 
04/22 17.82 250,803.63 Proceeds from FTP 
04/25 124.81 250,928.44 Proceeds from FTP 
04/28 55.32 250,983.76 Proceeds from FTP 
04/30 57.91 251,041.67 Proceeds from FTP 
04/30 1000.00 252,041.67 Interest for the month 
04/30 (2141.52) 249,900.15 Tontine-annuity Distribution 
 
4. Managing Investments 
Investments in a tontine annuity would most likely be managed 
collectively for the entire pool, but it would be possible to design a tontine 
annuity which allows members to direct their own investments, just as 
people often do with their self-directed 401(k) plans and IRAs.146 Pertinent 
here, rates of return are likely to be much higher if the investments are 
 
145 This hypothetical tontine annuity has approximately 5000 members of varying ages and 
genders who have made varying contributions. Mortality gains are based on a fair transfer–plan, 
and surviving members get a single payout at the end of the month based on the applicable 
monthly annuity factor. 
146 Of course, default investments could be offered to individual investors, just as target date 
funds are typically a default investment offered in self-directed 401(k) plans. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., TARGET DATE RETIREMENT FUNDS—TIPS FOR 
ERISA PLAN FIDUCIARIES (2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsTDF.pdf 
(providing guidance to fiduciaries of 401(k) and other employee-directed retirement programs 
regarding selecting and monitoring target date retirement funds). 
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managed by professionals rather than allowing individuals to direct their 
own investments.147  
In theory, a tontine annuity could be managed by a discount broker, and 
no money would have to be set aside for insurance agent commissions or 
insurance company reserves, risk-taking, or profits. Those commercial 
insurance charges can be quite hefty.148 For example, a recent Morningstar 
survey of 2037 variable annuities showed an average administrative fee in 
2014 of 1.33% of assets under management, and that fee is on top of the cost 
of managing the underlying investments, which itself can easily run another 
1.0%.149 To be sure, some discount brokers have recently teamed up with 
 
147 See Jonathan Barry Forman, The Future of 401(k) Plan Fees, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
REVIEW OF BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 9.02[2]-[3] (2007) (noting that 
large plan investors generally pay lower fees, have better portfolio allocations, and have profes-
sional investment advisors that pick better investment products); Alicia H. Munnell et al., 
Investment Returns: Defined Benefit vs. 401(k) Plans, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. 
Coll., Chestnut Hill, Mass.), Sept. 2006, at 6, available at http://www.hrpolicy.org/ 
members/downloads/2006/CRR_IB_09-2006.pdf (finding that professionally managed defined 
benefit plans outperformed individually managed 401(k) plans over the period 1988–2004).  
148 Indeed, experts estimate that the typical commercial life annuity has a 12% “load” factor 
due to the combination of administrative expenses and adverse selection; that is, the typical 
commercial life annuity provides benefits that are worth just 88% of an actuarially fair annuity 
(i.e., a “money’s worth ratio” of 88%). See MARK J. WARSHAWSKY, RETIREMENT INCOME: 
RISKS AND STRATEGIES 66 (2012) (“[D]ue to a combination of administrative costs and 
selection effects, the nominal annuity is assumed to have a money’s worth ratio of 0.88, that is, the 
couple faces a 12 percent load factor on their annuity purchase.”). Put differently, the payouts from 
actuarially fair annuities would be around 15% higher than in current annuity markets. See James 
Poterba et al., The Composition and Drawdown of Wealth in Retirement, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2011, 
at 102 tbl.3 (providing that the actuarially fair life annuity for a 65-year-old-man in 2008 was 
9.95% and the AnnuityShopper price for a commercial life annuity was just 8. 46%, thus indicating 
a load factor of 17.6%: 9.95%/8.46% - 1 = 17.6%); see also Jeffrey R. Brown et al., The Role of Real 
Annuities and Indexed Bonds in an Individual Accounts Retirement Program (“[T]he expected present 
value of annuity payouts is typically below the purchase price of the annuity . . . .”), in RISK 
ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 321, 321-22 ( John Y. Campbell 
& Martin Feldstein eds., 2001); James M. Poterba & Mark Warshawsky, The Costs of Annuitizing 
Retirement Payouts from Individual Accounts (“The cost of such annuities, including both administra-
tive and sales costs, the ‘adverse selection’ costs associated with voluntary purchase behavior, and 
return on capital for the insurance company offering the annuity policy, affect the retirement 
income that the participant receives for a given level of wealth accumulation.”), in ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 173, 173-74 ( John B. 
Shoven ed., 2000); Benjamin M. Friedman & Mark J. Warshawsky, The Cost of Annuities: 
Implications for Saving Behavior and Bequests, 105 Q.J. ECON. 135, 152 (1990) (arguing that 
actuarially unfair annuity costs are a cause of lack of public participation in the individual life 
annuity market); Olivia S. Mitchell et al., New Evidence on the Money’s Worth of Individual 
Annuities, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1299, 1309 (1999) (finding that a typical retiree “would perceive a 
noticeable ‘transaction cost’ when purchasing an annuity from a commercial insurance carrier”). 
149 Variable Annuity Expense Analyzer, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab.wallst.com/ 
Tools/VAAnalyzer/public (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/QW77-AE2K 
(noting the March 31, 2014 Morningstar survey); see also INSURED RET. INST., 2011 IRI FACT 
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insurance companies to offer low-cost variable annuities. For example, 
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., markets variable annuities with insurance 
charges that range from 0.60% to 0.65% (again, not including the additional 
administrative expenses involved in managing the investments),150 and The 
Vanguard Group, Inc. offers a variable annuity with an insurance charge of 
0.57%.151 Again, these insurance charges do not include the additional 
administrative expenses involved in managing the underlying investments. 
We are confident that discount brokers would be able to offer tontine 
annuities at even lower costs. As there are no insurance guarantees associated 
with tontine annuities, we believe that discount brokers could offer these 
products with total annual costs, perhaps, as low as 0.30% of assets under 
management, depending on the nature of the underlying investments. That 
means retirees would get significantly more benefits than they do with 
today’s high-cost variable annuities. For example, imagine a tontine annuity 
that invested entirely in an S&P 500 stock index fund. We know that most 
discount brokers offer an S&P 500 index fund with expense ratios of 0.10% 
or less,152 and we believe that the tontine annuity management and 
recordkeeping functions could be performed for as little as 0.20% of assets 
under management. That means total costs could be as low as 0.30% of 
assets under management. 
 
BOOK 56 figs.3-5 (2011), available at http://www.advisorsexcel.com/downloads/2011FactBook.pdf 
(showing that average total expenses for variable annuities in 2010 were 2.33%, compared with 
average total expenses for mutual funds that year of just 1.32%). The additional expenses associated 
with variable annuities include both so-called “mortality and expense” (M&E) charges and 
separately stated administrative expenses. 
150 CHARLES SCHWAB, supra note 149. 
151 The Vanguard Group, Inc. offers a variable annuity with a total expense ratio ranging 
from 0.46% to 0.77%. Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings with the Vanguard Variable Annuity, 
VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/annuity/variable (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YU8C-2UV6. 
152 See Spartan 500 Index Fund—Investor Class, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/ 
mutual-funds/summary/315911206 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5U42-
39BX (offering 0.10% gross expense ratio); see also Alicia H. Munnell et al., Will Regulations to 
Reduce IRA Fees Work?, ISSUE IN BRIEF (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Chestnut Hill, 
Mass.), Feb. 2013, at 2, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/IB_13-2-508.pdf 
(noting that many studies have found that actively managed funds underperform compared to 
index funds); Richard W. Kopcke et al., Fees and Trading Costs of Equity Mutual Funds in 401(k) 
Plans and Potential Savings From ETFs and Commingled Trusts (Ctr. for Ret. Research, Working 
Paper No. 2009-27, 2009), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/wp_2009-27-
508.pdf (encouraging a shift from actively managed funds to exchange-traded funds or commingled 
trusts). 
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In that regard, TIAA–CREF Financial Services has been offering a low-
cost, tontine-like product for years.153 Created in 1952, the College 
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) was the world’s first variable annuity.154 
Today, CREF operates eight investment accounts that differ by objective: 
stocks, bonds, money market, and social choice;155 and CREF keeps its costs 
for managing those accounts at between 0.395% and 0.465% of assets under 
management.156 CREF participants choose which fund to invest in; and 
later on, they choose from among a variety of distribution options, including 
one-life and two-life annuities.157 When a retiree selects a life annuity, the 
annuity payments will depend on both the investment experience of the 
chosen accounts and on the mortality experience of the other participants.158 
Basically, within each investment account, CREF periodically adjusts the 
annuity payments so that the present value of the aggregate amount 
expected to be paid out over the participants’ remaining lifetimes matches 
the current value of the assets in the account. If participants in the fund 
“live longer . . . than expected, the amount payable to each will be less than 
if they as a group die sooner than expected.”159 In short, like a tontine, the 
mortality risk falls on the annuitants and is not guaranteed by CREF (or 
TIAA).160 
 
153 See Our History, TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVICES, https://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/ 
assetmanagement/about/why/our-history (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/AD44-KSMY (describing the company’s products and programs since establishment). 
154 Id.; see also Poterba & Warshawsky, supra note 148, at 191-98 (discussing the history and 
development of individual annuities offered by TIAA–CREF). 
155 See TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT: COLLEGE RETIREMENT 
EQUITIES FUND 7-30 (2013), available at http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/ucm/groups/content/ 
@ap_ucm_p_tcp_inco/documents/document/tiaa01007803.pdf (analyzing the performance of the 
eight account types). 
156 TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., PROSPECTUS: COLLEGE RETIREMENT EQUITIES 
FUND 6 (2014), available at http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/prospectuses/cref_prospectus.pdf. 
157 Id. at 74-75. Of note, TIAA–CREF annuities have been using unisex life tables since 1982. 
See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1066 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that TIAA–
CREF is subject to Title VII, thus forbidding the use of sex-based mortality tables to calculate 
benefits based on contributions), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983). 
158 But see TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., supra note 156, at 76 (mentioning that mortality 
experience has “not historically had a significant impact”). 
159 Id. at 73. For more details, see generally TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., COLLEGE 
RETIREMENT EQUITIES FUND (“CREF”) SUPP. NO. 1 B-41 to B-42 (2014), available at 
http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/prospectuses/cref_sai.pdf. 
160 TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., supra note 156, at 73. Of note, rather than using a fair 
transfer–plan to share mortality gains from each dying member (as our tontine annuity would), 
CREF’s method shares aggregate mortality gains and losses. Consequently, some participants will 
get a better deal, and some will get a worse deal than they would with a fair transfer–plan. Cf. 
Sabin, supra note 15, at 59-62 (discussing the bias present in group self annuities that give some 
members better payouts than others). 
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As mentioned, tontines were popular at the end of the nineteenth century, 
but they fell out of favor at the beginning of the twentieth century, largely 
due to fraud and mismanagement of early tontine funds.161 In today’s post-
ERISA world, however, it would be relatively easy for the U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
Employee Benefits Security Administration to regulate tontine annuities 
and the fiduciaries that would manage them. Moreover, private sector 
recordkeepers and custodians would help protect tontine annuity assets.  
We live in an era in which new financial and lifetime income products 
are created all of the time. Indeed, GLWB funds were developed in Canada 
only recently, before spreading to the United States and other countries,162 
and as mentioned, a number of discount brokers have recently teamed up 
with insurance companies to offer low-cost variable annuities.163 Accordingly, 
we anticipate that a number of discount brokers and insurance companies 
 
Also, while our tontine pension (discussed infra Section II.D) results in forfeitures by workers 
as well as retirees, CREF participants do not face any forfeitures at all until participants voluntarily 
elect to take their distribution in the form of a one-life or two-life annuity, and typically such 
elections are not made until retirement after age 59.5. TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., supra note 156, 
at 72-75. 
Finally, we note in passing that tontine annuities and CREF annuities are not the only kind 
of “pooled annuities” that could share longevity risk among annuitants. See, e.g., Michel Denuit et 
al., Longevity-Indexed Life Annuities, 15 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 97, 99-100 (2011) (proposing 
longevity indexing as an alternative method to sharing longevity risk among annuitants and 
annuity providers); Catherine Donnelly et al., Exchanging Uncertain Mortality for a Cost, 52 INS.: 
MATHEMATICS & ECON. 65, 69, 71 (2013) (comparing pooled annuity funds with mortality-
linked funds); John Piggott et al., The Simple Analytics of a Pooled Annuity Fund, 72 J. RISK & INS. 
497, 499-501 (2005) (discussing the effect of risk diffusion on payouts in group self annuities); 
Andreas Richter & Frederik Weber, Mortality-Indexed Annuities: Managing Longevity Risk via 
Product Design, 15 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 212, 216-21 (2011) (proposing mortality indexing as a tool 
for improving traditional annuities); Michael Z. Stamos, Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Choice 
for Pooled Annuity Funds, 43 INS.: MATHEMATICS & ECON. 56, 58-61 (2008) (discussing how 
pooling effectively insures against longevity risk); Raimond Maurer et al., Participating Payout Life 
Annuities: Lessons from Germany 1 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2012-03, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2078114 (noting that “participating 
life annuities offer guaranteed minimum benefits” for life and “an additional non-guaranteed 
surplus” based on investment return, mortality, and costs); Roberto Rocha & Dimitri Vittas, 
Designing the Payout Phase of Pension Systems: Policy Issues, Constraints and Options 28-47 (The World 
Bank Non Bank Fin. Insts. Grp., Working Paper No. 5289, 2010), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/05/04/000158349_2010050409230
3/Rendered/PDF/WPS5289.pdf (proposing several policy responses to various types of pension 
risks). 
161 See supra text accompanying notes 12-14. 
162 See Milevsky & Shao, supra note 95, at 50, 56 (discussing the creation of GLWB products 
in Canada and their subsequent spread to the United States). 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 150-151. 
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will want to develop new tontine annuity products and seek the regulatory 
approvals that might be needed. 
5. Adverse Selection Is Always a Challenge for Annuities 
To be sure, underutilization would be a problem for tontine annuities, 
just as it is for traditional annuities. All in all, as more fully explained below, 
people rarely choose to buy annuities voluntarily. In fact, over the years, 
there has been a significant decline in the annuitization of retirement 
savings by American workers. The shift from traditional defined benefit 
plans to defined contribution plans is a large part of the story,164 as defined 
contribution plans typically distribute benefits in the form of lump sum 
distributions rather than as annuities.165 Indeed, relatively few defined 
contribution plans even offer annuity options, and, in any event, not many 
participants elect those annuity options.166 In short, the demand for annuities 
is lower than expected, a shortfall which has come to be known as the 
“annuity puzzle.”167 
 
164 See WILLIAM J. WIATROWSKI, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CHANGING 
LANDSCAPE OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED RETIREMENT BENEFITS 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/changing-landscape-of-employment-based-retirement-benefits.pdf 
(“It is well documented that the prevalence of defined benefit plans is declining; in many cases, 
such plans have been replaced by defined contribution plans.”); see also William J. Wiatrowski, The 
Last Private Industry Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2012, at 3, available 
at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/12/art1full.pdf (“[Defined benefit] plans are becoming rare 
for workers in private industry.”). 
165 TOWERS WATSON, supra note 48, at 15. 
166 See, e.g., CARLOS FIGUEIREDO & SANDY MACKENZIE, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., 
OLDER AMERICANS’ AMBIVALENCE TOWARD ANNUITIES: RESULTS OF AN AARP SURVEY 
OF PENSION PLAN AND IRA DISTRIBUTION CHOICES 6 n.6 (2012), available at 
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/econ_sec/2012/survey-
pension-ira-distribution-AARP-ppi-econ-sec.pdf (noting that the 54th Annual Survey of Profit 
Sharing and 401(k) Plans carried out by the Plan Sponsor Council of America found that just “16.6 
percent of all plans surveyed offered annuities as a distribution option, while 60.2% offered 
installments”); BEVERLY J. ORTH, APPROACHES FOR PROMOTING VOLUNTARY ANNUITIZATION 
(2008), available at http://www.soa.org/library/monographs/retirement-systems/retirement2020/ 
2008/november/mono-2008-m-rs08-01-orth.pdf (“[A] large percentage [of defined contribution 
plans] offer no [annuity] options. . . . [T]he vast majority of IRAs are never converted to an 
annuity.”); Paul J. Yakoboski, Retirees, Annuitization and Defined Contribution Plans, TRENDS & 
ISSUES (TIAA–CREF Institute, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2010, at 3, available at https://www.tiaa-
crefinstitute.org/public/pdf/institute/research/trends_issues/ti_definedcontribution0410.pdf (finding 
that only around 19% of retirees with significant defined contribution plan assets but little defined 
benefit pension income annuitized a portion of their retirement savings). 
167 See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi et al., Annuitization Puzzles, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2011, at 143, 
154-57 (discussing behavioral and institutional factors leading to the low demand for annuities); 
Franco Modigliani, Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 
307 (1986) (“[I]t is a well-known fact that annuity contracts, other than in the form of group 
insurance through pension systems, are extremely rare.”). See generally Menahem E. Yaari, 
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There are many reasons for this low demand for annuities, but adverse 
selection is one of the most important reasons.168 Basically, those who 
voluntarily purchase annuities tend to live longer than those that do not, 
and, consequently, annuities are not priced very well for those with normal 
life expectancies.169 
a. Adverse Selection and Tontine Annuities 
Adverse selection would also be a problem for tontine annuities. Just as 
the people who voluntarily purchase traditional annuities tend to live longer 
than those that do not, people who would choose to invest in a tontine 
annuity would tend to live longer than those who would not. To be sure, the 
tontine annuity would offer a better expected return than a commercial 
variable annuity, but coverage would nevertheless be skewed towards 
longer-lived investors. In short, as with traditional annuities, tontine 
annuities would be underutilized. 
b. Solving the Adverse Selection Problem 
In general, problems with adverse selection are solved with broad coverage.170 
For example, group health insurance premiums are low for large employers: 
they can generally ignore adverse selection as long as they provide 
healthcare coverage for virtually all of their employees. Similarly, Social 
Security and large defined benefit plan pensions can generally ignore 
adverse selection because they cover large numbers of employees. In short, 
the solution to adverse selection is to cover a broad group of individuals, 
and in the next Section, we show how a large employer could overcome the 
adverse selection against tontine annuities by adopting a “tontine pension” 
for a large group of its employees. 
 
Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 137 (1965) 
(analyzing the effect of the uncertainty of lifespan on consumer behavior). 
168 See GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, ANNUITY MARKETS AND PENSION REFORM 
55-57 (2006) (finding adverse selection and a lack of understanding of annuities to be potential 
factors that reduce the demand for annuities); see also Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial 
Sophistication in the Older Population 12-16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
17,863, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010395 (identifying 
the lack of financial sophistication, especially among the older population, as a potential source of 
poor decisionmaking about retirement). 
169 See MACKENZIE, supra note 168, at 43 (explaining that, in the life annuities market, 
moral hazard would lead to healthier behavior, meaning annuitants would tend to engage in 
behaviors increasing their lifespan).  
170 See id. at 41 (“Universal mandatory annuitization of part or all of the balances in individual 
accounts would lower the average life expectancy of the annuitant population, and should lower 
the average premium for each sex.”).  
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D. Tontine Pensions 
While tontine annuities would be attractive investments in their own 
right, they are likely to be as underutilized as traditional annuities and other 
lifetime income products.171 Individual investors generally underestimate 
their life expectancies and shy away from annuities and other lifetime 
income products. That is where pensions come in. Just as group health 
insurance spreads health risks over large groups, traditional defined benefit 
pension plans spread longevity risk over large groups: traditional pensions 
either provide annuity-like retirement benefits to their participants or 
purchase group annuities for them.172 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, traditional defined benefit pensions in 
both the private and public sector are often underfunded,173 and, in recent 
years, we have seen numerous plan sponsors freeze, terminate, or replace 
their plans.174 Market volatility, shrinking labor forces, and increasing life 
expectancies have all exerted pressure on traditional defined benefit plans 
and their sponsors. It is no wonder that we have seen defined contribution 
plans supplant defined benefit plans in the private sector, and there is 
increasing pressure on public employers to also consider replacing their 
traditional defined benefit plans with defined contribution plans. For 
example, 50% of full-time private industry workers in the United States 
participated in defined contribution plans in 2011, up from 40% in 1989–
1990; meanwhile, participation in defined benefit plans fell from 42% in 
1989–1990 to just 22% in 2011.175 All in all, the era of the traditional defined 
benefit plan is largely over.176 
 
171 See supra subsection II.C.5. 
172 See supra subsection I.B.2.a. 
173 See supra text accompanying notes 42-45. 
174 Id. Pertinent here, for example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation took over “111 
newly failed single-employer plans” in Fiscal Year 2013. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra 
note 43, at 5. Further, the City of Detroit went into bankruptcy in large part because of its pension 
debts. See Monica Davey et al., Detroit Ruling Lifts a Shield on Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, 
at A1 (discussing a bankruptcy judge’s finding that Detroit public employees’ pensions were not 
protected in a bankruptcy). 
175 WIATROWSKI, CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED RETIREMENT 
BENEFITS, supra note 164. More specifically, there were 683,000 private pension plans in 2011. 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN 1 
(2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2011pensionplanbulletin.PDF. These are 
ERISA-covered plans and do not include non-ERISA plans such as IRAs and Roth IRAs. Of 
these ERISA-covered plans, just 45,256 were defined benefit plans (with 40.9 million participants 
and $2.5 trillion in assets), while 638,390 were defined contribution plans (with 88.7 million 
participants and $3.8 trillion in assets). Id. at 3 tbl.A1. Of these defined contribution plans, 513,000 
were 401(k)-type plans. Id. at 2. 
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That is where tontine pension plans can come in. Like a typical defined 
contribution plan, a tontine pension would always be fully funded. Like a 
traditional defined benefit plan, however, a tontine pension would make 
annuity-like payments for as long as its retirees lived. This Section explains 
how a tontine pension would work. 
1. A Simple Tontine Pension 
An employer who wanted to provide a tontine pension for its employees 
would set up a defined-contribution-style pension plan, only instead of 
investing its contributions in stocks and bonds, the employer would invest 
in a tontine annuity for its employees. For example, each year, an employer 
might make contributions of 10% of its employees’ salaries. Those contribu-
tions would be held in trust and invested in a tontine annuity, and allocated 
to the individual tontine pension accounts of the participants. The differ-
ence is largely in the payouts. Rather than being able to receive lump sum 
distributions (or periodic payments or a life annuity), each tontine pension 
plan participant would receive benefits based on the tontine principle. That 
is, the employer contributions for each participant, and the investment 
earnings on those contributions, would be held in a tontine annuity, and the 
“monthly tontine-pension distributions” would be the only kind of distribu-
tions made to retirees. 
 
Also of note, a recent study estimated that 92% of the new pension plans formed from 2003–
2007 were defined contribution plans, as opposed to defined benefit plans. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-333, PRIVATE PENSIONS: SOME KEY FEATURES LEAD 
TO AN UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS 12 fig.2 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d11333.pdf. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, USE OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR 
RETIREMENT SAVING IN 2006 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cbofiles/attachments/2011-10-14-TaxIncentives.pdf (examining participation and contributions to 
various types of retirement plans by differing groups of workers). 
176 See GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, THE DECLINE OF THE TRADITIONAL PEN-
SION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREATS TO RETIREMENT SECURITY 3 (2010) (“[M]any 
observers believe that the defined benefit plan cannot survive as an institution in the private 
sector.”); EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 4 (2007) (noting “the shift from 
the defined benefit modality to the defined contribution format”); Barbara A. Butrica et al., The 
Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its Potential Impact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby 
Boomers, SOC. SECURITY BULL., 2009, at 1 (“The percentage of workers covered by a traditional 
defined benefit (DB) pension plan that pays a lifetime annuity, often based on years of service and 
final salary, has been steadily declining over the past 25 years.”); Janice Kay McClendon, The Death 
Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans: Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) Bottom, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 
809, 812 (2007) (“Even before the increased legislative requirements, traditional defined benefit 
plans were dying.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 
454 (2004) (describing the “emergence of the defined contribution society” as a “revolution” in 
pension plan form). 
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More specifically, starting at the participant’s normal retirement age (or 
later, if she so elected), the balance in her tontine pension account would be 
paid out to her in the same manner as if she had purchased her own tontine 
annuity with the employer contributions made on her behalf. No other form 
of distribution would ever be permitted. For example, for a typical worker 
who had accumulated $250,000 at her retirement, her monthly statement 
would look just like the sample monthly statement for the tontine annuitant 
in Table 7. 
In short, a tontine pension would provide lifetime retirement income in 
a way similar to a defined contribution platform. Essentially, the tontine 
pension is like a defined contribution plan that only pays benefits in the 
form of an actuarially fair life annuity. The difference is that rather than 
having the plan sponsor purchase annuities for each retiring employee or 
otherwise bear the risks and costs of providing the promised annuity 
benefits, with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor bears no investment or 
actuarial risks at all. The tontine pension would make distributions to 
retirees out of the funds accumulated in the underlying tontine annuity and 
in accordance with the fair transfer–plan and annuity-payback protocols. 
These monthly tontine-pension distributions could be designed to mimic 
immediate, level-payment annuities;177 immediate, inflation-adjusted 
annuities;178 deferred annuities;179 or joint and survivor annuities.180 
2.  Tontine Pensions Compared with Other Pension Alternatives 
a. Tontine Pensions Versus Traditional Defined Benefit Plans 
A tontine pension could easily be designed to pay benefits that were, on 
average, comparable to those paid by a traditional, final-average-pay defined 
benefit plan. To be sure, the benefits paid by a tontine pension would vary 
from month to month because of fluctuations in the value of the underlying 
assets and the variability inherent in the indeterminateness of the deaths of 
 
177 See infra Section III.C. 
178 Id. 
179 We note that a tontine pension is basically a kind of deferred annuity. For example, unless 
an unmarried participant survives until retirement, she would forfeit the balance in her tontine 
pension account (just like an unmarried participant in a traditional defined benefit plan). If she 
wanted to defer her payouts even longer, for example, until age 85, then her account would simply 
reinvest the mortality-gain distributions from dying participants until that time. Because of 
adverse selection, it might be necessary for such deferral elections to be made years in advance. 
180 For more on how to design such qualified joint and survivor tontine annuities, see infra 
subsection V.D.3. 
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other participants in the tontine pension. But, on average, benefits paid by a 
tontine pension would approximate an actuarially fair life annuity. 
With a defined benefit plan, the variation in monthly payments is elimi-
nated, but only because the plan sponsor (the employer) guarantees the 
promised payments. The plan sponsor bears all the contribution, mortality, 
and investment risks, and we have, of course, seen how poorly that has 
worked out, with thousands of failed plans in the private sector and numer-
ous underfunded plans in both the private and public sectors.181 While plan 
sponsors do a much better job growing investments than individuals,182 plan 
sponsors do not always have the discipline to make the contributions that 
are needed to keep their traditional defined benefit plans fully funded.183 
On the other hand, tontine pensions would always be fully funded, just as 
defined contribution plans are almost always fully funded—through regular 
contributions equal to, for example, 10% of salary.184  
In short, tontine pensions have two major advantages over traditional 
defined benefit plan pensions. First, unlike traditional pensions which are 
frequently underfunded, tontine pensions would always be fully funded. 
Second, unlike traditional pensions where the plan sponsor must bear all the 
investment and actuarial risks, with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor 
bears neither of those risks. 
b. Tontine Pensions Versus Typical Defined Contribution Plans 
So how do tontine pensions stack up against typical defined contribution 
plans? The answer is very well, indeed. Like a typical defined contribution 
plan, a typical tontine pension might start with employer contributions 
equal to, for example, 10% of salary. In the typical defined contribution plan, 
however, the participants are often allowed to direct the investment of their 
individual accounts, and payouts almost always take the form of lump sum 
and periodic distributions, rather than life annuities.185 On the other hand, 
with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor could, and should, manage the 
 
181 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
182 See, e.g., Forman & Mackenzie, supra note 29, at 6-39 to 6-40 (“[T]raditional defined 
benefit plans generally outperform [individually managed] 401(k) plans.”); Forman, supra note 147, 
at 9-5 (noting that there were “numerous economies of scale associated with traditional pension 
plans”); Munnell et al., supra note 147, at 6 (“Preliminary data suggest that IRAs underperform 
employer-sponsored plans.”). 
183 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
184 To be sure, employers sometimes cut their contribution rates to defined contribution 
plans, but such plans are still fully funded by the contributions that are made. 
185 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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investments, and benefits would be paid out only as a tontine pension that 
approximates an actuarially fair variable annuity. 
To be sure, a plan sponsor could design a defined contribution plan 
where the plan sponsor manages all the investments and where benefits are 
only paid out in the form of a life annuity. But we know of no defined 
contribution plans like that, and we doubt that any employer with a defined 
contribution plan would have the discipline to design and continue such a 
plan in the face of employee expectations and demands (1) that the employees 
be allowed to direct their investments and (2) that the employees be allowed 
to receive the balance in their accounts as periodic or lump sum distribu-
tions rather than only as life annuities. 
In fact, we believe that a tontine pension is reasonably analogous to a 
defined contribution plan with mandatory annuitization. There are a couple 
of key differences, however. First, with a tontine pension, those who survive 
until retirement would also benefit from the forfeitures of the accounts of 
those who did not. As far as we know, that does not happen with any 
defined contribution plans. Second, while a tontine pension would 
automatically provide benefits that approximate an actuarially fair life 
annuity, a defined contribution plan would have to purchase a lower-
yielding commercial annuity to provide a mandatory annuitization benefit. 
c. Tontine Pensions Versus Cash Balance Plans 
A tontine pension is also similar to a cash balance plan with mandatory 
annuitization. In a cash balance plan, the sponsor credits hypothetical 
individual accounts with contributions of, for example, 10% of compensa-
tion. As with traditional defined benefit plans, the default benefit in a cash 
balance plan is a life annuity; however, cash balance plans typically allow 
lump sum and periodic distributions as well.186 Indeed, we doubt that there 
are many cash balance plans that require benefits be taken in the form of a 
life annuity, and we doubt that there are many employers that would have 
the discipline to design or to continue such a plan in the face of employee 
expectations and demands that the employees be allowed to receive the 
balance in their accounts as periodic or lump sum distributions rather 
than only as annuities. 
 
186 See FAQs About Cash Balance Pension Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/FAQs/faq_consumer_cashbalanceplans.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/YHH2-Q4S6 (noting that cash balance plan participants can receive 
these kinds of distributions). 
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Moreover, because cash balance plans are defined benefit plans, like tra-
ditional pensions, cash balance plans are often underfunded.187 On the other 
hand, with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor’s contributions would be 
fixed at, for example, 10% of compensation, and the plan would then be fully 
funded with those actual contributions. The plan sponsor would then 
manage and grow the investments, and the tontine-pension distributions 
would approximate an actuarially fair life annuity. 
3. Summary of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Tontine Pensions 
In essence, a tontine pension would be like a traditional defined benefit 
pension plan, except that it would always be fully funded and the plan 
sponsor would never bear any of the investment or actuarial risks. Participants 
would receive monthly tontine pension benefits for as long as they lived, 
and a tontine pension could be designed to provide inflation-adjusted 
annuities, deferred annuities, or joint and survivor annuities.188 Conceivably, 
individual participants could be allowed to make additional elective 
contributions to their accounts, just as they do now under 401(k)-type 
plans.189  
The principal disadvantage of a tontine pension is that monthly 
payments would vary in amount. One source of variation is the randomness 
of member deaths, but the more individuals who participate in the plan, the 
less significant that noisiness would be. For a tontine pension that covers 
thousands of participants, the variation due to random deaths would be 
minimal.190 However, there could still be considerable variation due to 
volatility in both the value of the underlying assets and the rate of return on 
those assets.191 
Finally, as with traditional defined benefit plans, participants who live 
the longest would collect the most benefits, and those who died young 
might not even recover the amounts contributed on their behalf. Of course, 
that is the nature of traditional defined benefit plans, life annuities, and 
most other lifetime income products, so it is not a “disadvantage” unique to 
tontine pension plans. 
 
187 See Kevin Olsen, PBGC Sues to Take Over Dewey & LeBoeuf Retirement Plans, PENSIONS 
& INVESTMENTS (May 15, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120515/ONLINE/ 
120519943/pbgc-sues-to-take-over-dewey-amp-leboeuf-retirement-plans, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/L5ZT-UTFW (describing an example of an underfunded cash balance pension plan). 
188 See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text. 
189 But see infra subsection V.D.2 (providing reasons why participants might be reluctant to 
make such contributions). 
190 See supra subsection II.B.3.a. 
191 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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III. MODELING A SIMPLE TONTINE PENSION 
In this Part, we design a model tontine pension for a large employer and 
then use a computer simulation to see what kinds of tontine pension 
benefits the participants could expect to receive. 
A. The Parameters of the Simulation 
Our computer simulation uses a pool of approximately 170,000 members 
(approximately 100,000 active employees and 70,000 retirees). The 
parameters of the simulation are as follows: 
 The employer hires 3600 employees each year (300 each month). 
 The employee’s gender is randomly selected, equiprobably male or 
female. 
 Each employee is hired on her 35th birthday and works continuously 
for the employer for 30 years until age 65, or earlier death.192  
 Each employee is hired at a salary of $50,000 a year, and her 
salary increases 4.0% each year.193 
 At retirement, each employee receives a tontine pension until 
death. 
 In this simple simulation, nobody is married (so no 
joint and survivor annuity benefits are needed). 
 The account balances of those who die are forfeited.194 
 Every year, the employer contributes 10% of salary for every employee 
to the tontine pension.195 
 
192 We chose 30 years as a reasonable career with the employer. Obviously, workers who work 
35 years would earn proportionally more tontine pension benefits, and those who work 25 years 
would earn proportionately less benefits. Tontine pension benefits would also vary if workers 
started working before or after our assumed start age of 35 or retired before or after our assumed 
retirement age of 65. 
193 In that regard, for example, the CalSTRS defined benefit plan uses a 3.75% annual wage 
growth assumption. MILLIMAN, supra note 19, at 57 tbl.B.1. 
194 If we had assumed that living workers could leave, their account balances would go with 
them to their new employer’s plan, and vice versa, so we ignore them. 
195 We use the very plausible 10% contribution rate. That rate has the added advantage that it 
is easy to extrapolate away from it. For example, if one thinks that 15% is a better contribution 
rate, one need only multiply most of our model’s results by 150%. Nor must the contributions 
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 Investment return: funds are professionally managed and earn 7.0% 
net of investment expenses each and every year, compounded annually.196 
 Inflation is 3.0% each year.197 
 Workers receive no payouts until age 65,198 and then retirees receive 
either uniform (fixed) annuity-type payouts or, alternatively, inflation-
adjusted annuity-type payouts.199 
 The mortality model is based on the Social Security Administration 
2009 unisex mortality table.200 
 Therefore, at equilibrium, approximately 3000 out of the 
3600 initial hires each year reach age 65; approximately 
100,000 are actively employed at any time; and there are 
approximately 70,000 retirees at any point in time. 
B. Calculation of the Retirement Balance 
At the outset, Table 8 shows how this tontine pension would work for 
workers ages 35 through 64. Column 1 of Table 8 shows the age of each 
worker from ages 35 through 64. Column 2 shows the salary of that worker 
each year. Column 3 shows the amount of the 10%-of-salary contribution 
that her employer makes to the tontine pension on her behalf each year. 
 
necessarily come from the employer: the results would be exactly the same if the employer and 
employee each contributed 5% of salary, for a total of 10%. 
196 Our 7.0% investment return assumption is also fairly reasonable. For example, the 
CalSTRS defined benefit plan uses 7.5% as its estimate of investment return (net of investment 
and administrative expenses). MILLIMAN, supra note 19, at 57 tbl.B.1. While many public pension 
plans have even higher assumed rates of return and have historically achieved those higher rates of 
return, many analysts believe we are in a low return environment for the indefinite future. See 
James J. Rizzo & Piotr Krekora, Presentation on the Goldilocks Principle & Investment Return 
Assumptions at Florida Government Finance Officers Association 2013 Annual Conference 41 
(June 25, 2013), available at http://www.fgfoa.org/Assets/Files/Jim_Rizzo_Presentation_PDF.pdf 
(finding that 6.78% was the average rate of return projected by 8 national investment consulting 
firms for public pension plan portfolios over the next 15 years, compared with the 8% rate of return 
that those plans commonly assume). 
197 For example, the CalSTRS defined benefit plan uses a 3.0% inflation assumption. MIL-
LIMAN, supra note 19, at 57 tbl.B.1. 
198 To make the simulation less complicated, only the retirement phase (i.e., the payouts to 
those age 65 and older) was simulated. The account balance at age 65 was set equal to the expected 
value (i.e., the statistical average) of the account of a worker who survives to age 65. The number 
of workers surviving to retirement was set to its expected value from the Social Security 
Administration’s 2009 unisex life table. Bye, supra note 109. 
199 That is, the expected value of payouts is either uniform or inflation-adjusted. 
200 Bye, supra note 109. 
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Column 4 shows the account balance at the end of the year, not including 
the mortality gains that would result from the forfeitures from other 
members who died that year.201 Column 5 shows the worker’s probability of 
dying during that year. Finally, Column 6 shows the closing balance in the 
worker’s account including the mortality gains that result from the forfei-
tures from other members who died that year.202 The final row of Table 8 
shows that a worker who lived (and worked) from age 35 through age 64 and 
retired at 65 would have a final pre-retirement salary of $155,933 (Column 2) 
and would have a starting retirement balance in her tontine pension account 
of $843,376 (Column 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
201 It is calculated as the sum of the prior year’s balance multiplied by (1 plus the interest 
rate) plus the current year’s contribution multiplied by the square root of (1 plus the interest rate). 
202 This is the expected value of the balance that results from mortality gains. See supra note 
198. It is computed by taking the preliminary balance in Column 4 and dividing it by (1 minus the 
death probability) in Column 5. For example, the closing balance in the account of an employee at 
age 64 is $843,377 ($843,376.82 = $833,161/(1 - 0.012113)) (minor error due to rounding). 
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Table 8: Calculation of the Retirement Balance 
 
Age Salary Contribution Preliminary 
Balance
Death 
Probability
Closing 
Balance 
35 $50,000 $5000 $5172 0.001261 $5179 
36 $52,000 $5200 $10,920 0.001332 $10,935 
37 $54,080 $5408 $17,294 0.001420 $17,319 
38 $56,243 $5624 $24,349 0.001527 $24,386 
39 $58,493 $5849 $32,144 0.001653 $32,197 
40 $60,833 $6083 $40,743 0.001796 $40,816 
41 $63,266 $6327 $50,218 0.001955 $50,316 
42 $65,797 $6580 $60,644 0.002133 $60,774 
43 $68,428 $6843 $72,107 0.002332 $72,275 
44 $71,166 $7117 $84,696 0.002550 $84,912 
45 $74,012 $7401 $98,512 0.002786 $98,787 
46 $76,973 $7697 $113,665 0.003041 $114,011 
47 $80,052 $8005 $130,273 0.003322 $130,707 
48 $83,254 $8325 $148,468 0.003630 $149,009 
49 $86,584 $8658 $168,396 0.003963 $169,066 
50 $90,047 $9005 $190,215 0.004326 $191,042 
51 $93,649 $9365 $214,102 0.004707 $215,114 
52 $97,395 $9740 $240,247 0.005086 $241,475 
53 $101,291 $10,129 $268,856 0.005455 $270,331 
54 $105,342 $10,534 $300,150 0.005827 $301,910 
55 $109,556 $10,956 $334,376 0.006234 $336,473 
56 $113,938 $11,394 $371,812 0.006685 $374,315 
57 $118,496 $11,850 $412,774 0.007166 $415,753 
58 $123,236 $12,324 $457,604 0.007677 $461,144 
59 $128,165 $12,817 $506,681 0.008233 $510,888 
60 $133,292 $13,329 $560,438 0.008854 $565,444 
61 $138,623 $13,862 $619,364 0.009552 $625,338 
62 $144,168 $14,417 $684,024 0.010323 $691,159 
63 $149,935 $14,994 $755,050 0.011172 $763,580 
64 $155,933 $15,593 $833,161 0.012113 $843,376 
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C. Calculation of the Monthly Tontine-Pension Distributions 
At retirement, the expected monthly payout is identical to the actual 
monthly payout of an actuarially fair annuity. As we have seen, the monthly 
payout of an actuarially fair annuity equals the account balance divided by 
the applicable monthly annuity factor.203 For example, consider a worker 
who worked from age 35 through age 64 and retired on the last day of that 
year. We can see from the last entry in Table 8 that the closing account 
balance for that worker was $843,376. Assuming that she wants to draw level 
monthly tontine pension payments for the rest of her life, she should start 
by looking at Column 5 of Appendix Table 1, which shows that the uniform 
monthly annuity factor for the first month after she turns 65 is almost 118. 
Therefore, the first monthly distribution for a uniform tontine pension 
would be $7166 ($7165.84 = $843,376/117.6939). 
Alternatively, if this retiree instead wanted inflation-adjusted payments 
for the rest of her life, Column 6 of Appendix Table 1 shows that the initial 
monthly annuity factor for the first month after she turns 65 is almost 152. 
Accordingly, the first monthly distribution for an inflation-adjusted tontine 
pension would be just $5549 ($5548.98 = $843,376/151.9876). 
Figure 2 plots the expected payouts from these uniform and inflation-
adjusted tontine pensions over time. The plot is for a member retiring on 
her 65th birthday. The uniform payout is the amount of the monthly 
payment in dollars. Ideally it is a constant $7166 per month for life—and 
that is what an actuarially fair life annuity would pay.204 The actual payments 
would fluctuate a little bit around that value, but as the plot shows, the 
uniform payout curve is relatively smooth. Of course, that is what we would 
expect given that our model assumes a constant 7% rate of return and a 
constant 3% inflation rate. Consequently, monthly fluctuations result only 
from the randomness of deaths in the population, but with approximately 
70,000 retirees at any point in time, those fluctuations are insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
203 See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text. 
204 For comparison, an annuity purchased from a commercial insurer would make a fixed 
monthly payment but of a lower amount depending on the insurer’s load charge. For a typical load 
of 10%, the monthly payment would fall to just $6449.40 ($6449.40 = $7166 × 90%). 
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Figure 2: Monthly Payout for a Typical Long-Lived Member,  
Uniform and Inflation-Adjusted 
 
By contrast, the inflation-adjusted payout starts at $5549 per month and 
increases at an annual rate of 3% per year—that is what an actuarially fair 
life annuity with a 3% escalator would pay (and the model assumes a 
constant 3% inflation rate). Again, the actual payments will fluctuate a little 
bit around those values, but as the plot shows, the inflation-adjusted payout 
curve is also quite smooth.  
D. Adequacy 
All in all, we have shown how a large employer could use a tontine 
pension to provide retirement benefits for its employees. Given the 
assumptions in our model, Table 8 showed that our hypothetical retiree 
would have a final salary of $155,933 at age 64 and would have accumulated 
$843,376 by age 65. The latter sum would support a uniform tontine pension 
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of around $7166 per month for life or an inflation-adjusted tontine pension 
that starts at around $5549 per month at age 65 and increases in later 
months. 
It is relatively easy to determine how much pre-retirement income this 
30-year, 10%-of-salary tontine pension would replace. For example, 
multiplying the uniform monthly benefit of $7166 by 12 months yields an 
annual tontine pension of $85,992 ($85,992 = 12 × $7166), and it is easy to see 
that the tontine pension would replace 55.1% of pre-retirement earnings in 
the first year of retirement (i.e., a “replacement ratio” of 55.1% (0.5514676 = 
$85,992/$155,933)).205 Similarly, the inflation-adjusted monthly benefit 
would yield an annual tontine pension starting at around $66,588 ($66,588 = 
12 × $5549) and a replacement ratio of around 42.7% of pre-retirement 
earnings (0.4270295 = $66,588/$155,933).206 In addition to these tontine 
pensions, however, our retiree would almost certainly receive Social Security 
benefits, and those Social Security benefits would replace another 35% to 
40% of her pre-retirement income.207 
All in all, it seems that a 10%-of-salary tontine pension would generate a 
pretty substantial retirement benefit for the typical worker. Moreover, 
raising the tontine pension contribution rate (e.g., above 10%) or increasing 
 
205 The replacement ratio is the ratio of income in retirement to income pre-retirement. The 
desired replacement ratio is almost always assumed to be less than 100% because of the elimination 
of work-related expenses, because some pre-retirement income was devoted to saving for 
retirement, and because Social Security benefits are taxed more favorably than earned income. See 
AON CONSULTING, REPLACEMENT RATIO STUDY: A MEASUREMENT TOOL FOR RETIREMENT 
PLANNING 24 (2008), available at http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/
attachments/human-capital-consulting/RRStudy070308.pdf (estimating that required replacement 
ratios ranged from 77% for a person earning $80,000 a year in 2008 to 94% for a person earning 
$20,000 that year). 
206 Because of the impact of the 3% inflation assumption and the passage of time on the 
monthly tontine pension annuity factors, our retiree could expect that her monthly tontine 
pension benefits for the 11 months following her initial month of retirement would be slightly 
larger than the $5549 that she would receive in the first month of that retirement year. 
Accordingly, she should receive an annual pension of slightly more than $66,588 at age 65 and 
have a replacement ratio of slightly higher than 42.7%. 
207 See VIRGINIA P. RENO & ELISA A. WALKER, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS., SOCIAL SE-
CURITY BENEFITS, FINANCES, AND POLICY OPTIONS: A PRIMER 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/2013_Social_Security_Primer_PDF.pdf (showing 
that the current Social Security system replaces around 42% of the pre-retirement earnings of a 
worker with “medium” earnings); see also PETER BRADY ET AL., INV. CO. INST., THE SUCCESS 
OF THE U.S. RETIREMENT SYSTEM 17-20 (2012), available at http://www.ici.org/ 
pdf/ppr_12_success_retirement.pdf (showing how Social Security replacement rates vary over time 
for representative workers); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2012 LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS 
FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 16 exhibit 10 (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43653 (showing how replacement rates vary with pre-retirement 
earnings). 
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the number of working years (e.g., above 30) covered by the tontine pension 
would result in retirees receiving even more benefits and having even higher 
replacement ratios. 
E. Tontine Pensions in the Real World 
Our model does a respectable job of showing how a tontine pension 
could work in the real world. To be sure, the assumptions of the model are 
somewhat rigid. In the real world, inflation is not always 3% per year, wages 
do not always increase by 4% per year, and investments do not always earn a 
7% rate of return. Each of those parameters is highly variable, although their 
average values are probably pretty close to our assumed values. In general, 
that real world variability could easily result in retirees receiving smaller (or 
larger) monthly distributions from their tontine pensions. To the extent that 
that real-world volatility puts retirement income security at risk, it is worth 
reiterating that either raising the tontine pension contribution rate or 
increasing the number of working years covered by the tontine pension 
would result in retirees receiving more benefits and having higher replacement 
ratios. 
IV. REPLACING THE CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM WITH A TONTINE PENSION 
In this Part, we consider how a tontine pension for a large employer 
would work. Given the strictures of ERISA and federal securities regulation 
laws, we acknowledge that it may be a challenge for a private pension plan 
sponsor to create a tontine pension under current law.208 On the other hand, 
public employers are exempt from most of ERISA’s pension regulations.209 
Accordingly, we believe that a state government could easily create a tontine 
pension that would not run afoul of federal law. As we have seen, such a 
tontine pension would be fully funded and would make annuity-like 
payments to retirees for as long as they lived.210 
As most states already have pension plans that cover most of their 
employees, what we are really talking about here is the prospect of replacing 
 
208 For a more thorough discussion of the legal issues involving tontine pensions, see infra 
Section V.B. 
209 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) 
(2012) (exempting government plans). 
210 See supra Section II.D. We recognize that many governments use their pension plans to 
provide disability benefits, and some also use their pension plans to provide retiree health benefits. 
However, for simplicity we have ignored both disability benefits and retiree health benefits in this 
Article. 
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an existing state pension plan with a tontine pension. In particular, some 
states might want to replace their underfunded traditional defined benefit 
pension plans with tontine pensions. For our example, this Part considers 
whether California might want to replace the $74 billion underfunded 
California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) defined benefit 
plan with a tontine pension.211 
A. Background on the California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
CalSTRS is the largest educator-only pension in the world, with a 
membership of 868,493 and assets of approximately $187.1 billion as of 
October 31, 2014.212 One of the largest programs that CalSTRS administers 
is its traditional defined benefit retirement plan, where benefits are based on 
a member’s years of service, age, and highest compensation.213 Essentially, 
members receive an annual retirement benefit (B) that is equal to 2% 
multiplied by the number of years of service (yos) multiplied by final 
average compensation (  fac) (B = 2% × yos × fac).  
For the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 2013, the CalSTRS traditional 
defined benefit pension had 416,643 active members with an average annual 
salary of $61,153 and 269,274 retired members and beneficiaries with an 
average annual retirement benefit of $43,308.214 Also, as of June 30, 2013, the 
CalSTRS defined benefit plan was only 66.9% funded, with an unfunded 
liability of almost $74 billion.215 The normal retirement benefit cost, 
expressed as a percentage of total compensation, was 16.818%.216 In addi-
tion, as of June 30, 2013, CalSTRS needed another 14.620% of total compen-
sation to amortize its $74 billion unfunded liability over 30 years.217 
 
211 See MILLIMAN, supra note 19, at 10. 
212 CalSTRS at a Glance, CALSTRS, http://www.calstrs.com/glance (last visited Jan. 16, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/WPH6-72ML. 
213 See Retirement Benefits Calculator, CALSTRS, http://resources.calstrs.com/CalSTRSCom 
ResourcesWebUI/Calculators/Pages/RetirementBenefit.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L86P-VXGC (providing a list of factors used to calculate benefits). CalSTRS also 
administers a defined benefit supplement program, a cash balance benefit program, and CalSTRS 
“Pension2.” For more details, see generally CAL. STATE TEACHERS’ RET. SYS., OVERVIEW OF 
THE CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM AND RELATED ISSUES (2014), 
available at http://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/overview_2014_v3.pdf. 
214 MILLIMAN, supra note 19, at 10. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 18 tbl.1. Under the entry-age normal cost accounting method, the normal cost is 
calculated to produce a level cost over each employee’s career (i.e., a level percentage of payroll). 
The normal cost generally represents the expected cost of projected benefits attributable to work 
performed and pension benefits earned in the current plan year. Id. at 15. 
217 Id. at 47 tbl.15. 
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B. Replacing the California State Teachers’ Retirement System Defined Benefit 
Plan with a Tontine Pension 
There are a variety of possible ways to replace a traditional pension like 
the CalSTRS defined benefit plan with a tontine pension. Perhaps the most 
likely approach would be to keep the current defined benefit plan for all 
current employees but to close entry to that plan and require all new 
employees to join a newly created tontine pension.218  
A more interesting approach would be for CalSTRS to freeze its current 
defined benefit plan and add a new tontine pension for all future benefit 
accruals.219 At retirement, beneficiaries would then receive the defined 
benefit plan benefits that they have already accrued, but they would not 
accrue any additional benefits under their traditional defined benefit plan; 
instead, future contributions would be made to a new tontine pension. 
Theoretically, CalSTRS would freeze its defined benefit plan and add a 
tontine pension with future retirement contributions set at, for example, 
16.818% of compensation (i.e., the current CalSTRS defined benefit plan’s 
normal cost rate).220 Going forward, such a plan would be roughly as 
generous as the current plan, but CalSTRS would never again have to worry 
about underfunding as a result of future benefit accruals. To be sure, this way 
of replacing the CalSTRS defined benefit plan with a tontine pension would 
do nothing to reduce its $74 billion unfunded liability, and that obligation 
would still need to be met by the state of California. 
We do not mean to suggest that replacing the CalSTRS defined benefit 
plan with a tontine pension would be politically easy. We merely suggest 
that a tontine pension could provide an alternative way of providing lifetime 
retirement income to California teachers, and we reiterate that unlike 
traditional defined benefit plans—which are often underfunded—a tontine 
pension can never become underfunded. 
 
 
 
218 Cf. Jonathan Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and Defined 
Contribution Plans, 1999 MICH. ST. L. REV. 187, 208-10 (discussing various ways to transition 
from a traditional defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan, but noting the difficulties 
inherent in making this switch). 
219 See id. at 210 (describing this approach). 
220 See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
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V. SOLVING THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF  
CREATING A TONTINE PENSION 
Finally, this Part addresses some of the technical issues raised by tontine 
pensions. 
A. Taxation of Benefits 
Presumably, tontine pension benefits would be taxed like other pension 
benefits.221 Employer contributions to a tontine pension should be excluded 
from the income of employees; the tontine pension fund’s earnings should 
be exempt from tax; and retirees should be taxed only when they receive 
their monthly tontine-pension distributions. At the same time, the employer 
should be allowed a current deduction for its contributions to the tontine 
pension.222 We note that the prospectus for CREF suggests that CREF’s 
tontine-like pensions and annuities are taxed in accordance with these 
principles.223  
B. Legal Issues 
Although not a certainty, it appears that tontine funds, tontine annuities, 
and tontine pensions are all legal. As previously mentioned, investigations 
of the insurance industry in New York led to the enactment of legislation in 
1906 that all but banned tontines.224 To be sure, the legislation did not 
specifically prohibit the sale of tontines; instead, it just made it difficult for 
companies to defer payments beyond one year.225 Many states followed New 
York’s lead, and tontines soon fell out of favor.226  
Much has changed since the beginning of the twentieth century, however. 
In particular, financial products today do a much better job at 
recordkeeping,227 and investment assets are usually held by independent 
 
221 See supra subsection I.B.1. 
222 To the extent that any employees make (or are deemed to make) any after-tax 
contributions to their tontine pension funds, they should be allowed to recover those contribu-
tions tax-free, just as they could with a typical pension or annuity. See supra note 33. 
223 See TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., supra note 156, at 81-87 (describing the tax implications 
of similar existing pension plans). 
224 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
225 COOPER, supra note 9, at 56. 
226 Id. at 57. 
227 Today, for example, there are numerous laws that govern the securities industry. The Laws 
that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
EWG5-9VWW. Also, we have seen that ERISA imposes a number of recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements on pension plan sponsors. See supra subsection I.B.3.  
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custodians.228 Also, most states have softened their views on lotteries 
and gambling.229 Accordingly, there should be less suspicion about tontine 
financial products. In fact, today, only Louisiana and South Carolina have 
statutes that actually ban tontines.230 All in all, it seems likely that tontine 
financial products could be designed in ways that would survive state 
regulatory scrutiny. Indeed, as we have seen, CREF is arguably a tontine,231 
and it operates in, and is expressly regulated, by the State of New York, as 
well as by the insurance regulators of certain other states.232 Any state that 
wished to set up a tontine pension for its own workers could enact a statute 
to permit that state to do so. 
Tontine financial products should also be able to withstand federal regu-
latory scrutiny. As long as tontine financial products maintain good records, 
make adequate disclosures, and ensure that the underlying investment assets 
are held by independent custodians, the SEC should be satisfied. 
For some tontine pensions, ERISA may present some regulatory 
hurdles. However, unless they are “established or maintained” by an 
employers or a union, tontine funds and tontine annuities would not be 
“employee benefit plans” within the meaning of ERISA’s section 4 coverage 
rule, and therefore would not be subject to ERISA.233 
 
228 Investor Bulletin: Custody of Your Investment Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION, http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/bulletincustody.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/8UQM-XJ6J. 
229 Chris Isidore, Seven States that Don’t Have Lotteries, CNNMONEY (Dec. 17, 2013, 1:16 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/17/news/economy/states-without-lotteries, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3CBZ-WLAV; Richard A. McGowan, A Short History of Gambling in the United 
States, OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS IN CONTEXT, http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ 
ViewpointsDetailsPage/ViewpointsDetailsWindow?displayGroupName=Viewpoints& 
disableHighlighting=false&prodId=OVIC&action=2&catId=&documentId=GALE%7CEJ3010079 
223&userGroupName=sacr73031&jsid=62916e0a417a2c9be8c6da4f4edc7ffc (last visited Jan. 16, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/YQ73-5NHH. 
230 McKeever, supra note 9, at 514. 
231 See supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text. 
232 TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., supra note 159, at B-44. 
233 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2012) 
(defining “employee benefit plan”); id. § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2012) (imposing coverage on “any 
employee benefit plan”). 
Moreover, to the extent that any tontine annuities might be subject to ERISA, we believe that 
ERISA’s insurance savings clause is relevant with respect to any tontine annuity viewed as an 
insurance product under the applicable state’s law. In that regard, ERISA’s preemption clause 
provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws . . . [that] relate to any employee 
benefit plan”; however, the savings clause then exempts from preemption any state law “which 
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” Id. § 514(a), (b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2)(A). 
Congress generally left the regulation of insurance products to the states. Presumably, tontine 
annuities sold by insurance companies would be subject to regulation by state insurance regulators. 
But what about tontine annuities sold by a discount broker? Are these just investment products or 
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On the other hand, tontine pensions established by employers or unions 
would be “employee benefit plans” within the meaning of ERISA.234 As 
mentioned above, government plans are exempt from ERISA, so state and 
local governments could set up tontine pensions for their employees 
without having to comply with ERISA.235 
Conversely, private-sector tontine pension plans would be subject to 
ERISA. The next question is whether there are any provisions of ERISA 
that would prevent private employers from creating tontine pensions for 
their employees. To be sure, traditional pensions exhibit tontine characteristics; 
for example, those who live longer will accrue more (monthly) benefits than 
those who die younger.236  
Nevertheless, several provisions of ERISA may pose regulatory chal-
lenges for private-sector tontine pensions. 
For example, with respect to defined benefit plans, Internal Revenue 
Code section 401(a)(8) indicates that “forfeitures must not be applied to 
increase the benefits any employee would otherwise receive under the 
plan.”237 With a tontine pension, all participants are entitled to a benefit 
that approximates an actuarially fair annuity. Therefore, those who live 
longer will get more (monthly) benefits than those who die younger. 
Because this is exactly what happens under a traditional defined benefit 
plan, we believe that tontine pensions should not be viewed as applying 
forfeitures to increase the benefits of other employees in violation of section 
401(a)(8), and accordingly, we believe that the Internal Revenue Service 
should be willing to issue guidance to that effect (e.g., a private letter 
ruling). Moreover, we note that defined benefit plans have always been 
allowed to invest in annuities for their employees. Accordingly, we believe 
that defined benefit plans would be permitted to invest in tontine annuities. 
Of course, employers might prefer to operate their tontine pensions on a 
fully funded defined contribution plan platform. In that case, section 
401(a)(8) would not be applicable. 
ERISA’s vesting rules may also pose a regulatory challenge for tontine 
pensions. For example, could a tontine pension meet the three-year cliff 
 
are they insurance? We are unsure. However, because tontine annuities alone are not employee 
benefit plans, we believe that they are outside the scope of ERISA. 
234 In general, a tontine pension would be an “employee benefit plan . . . . established or 
maintained by” an employer or employee organization within the meaning of ERISA section 4. Id. 
§ 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2012); id. § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2012). 
235 See id. § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2012) (exempting government plans). 
236 COOPER, supra note 9, at 61 (explaining the distribution of benefits over time in tradi-
tional pensions). 
237 I.R.C. § 401(a)(8) (2012).  
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vesting rule that generally applies to employer contributions?238 How do we 
interpret the fact that a single worker with a tontine pension account would 
lose everything in her account at death, even if she had worked for the 
employer for more than three years? Is forfeiture at death allowed in a 
defined contribution plan investment?  
One approach is to ask whether an employer with a defined contribution 
plan could use employer contributions each year to buy commercial life 
annuities for each employee. We believe an employer could do so. Because 
tontine annuities would work just like commercial annuities, an employer 
should be able to design a defined contribution plan that invests in tontine 
annuities for its employees, even if those tontine annuities become worth-
less at death.239 
ERISA’s fiduciary obligation rules could also pose some regulatory chal-
lenges for tontine pensions.240 For example, pension plans must be operated 
for the exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries, and plan 
fiduciaries must act prudently and diversify the plan’s investments.241 Again, 
we see no reason to be concerned about a pension operating as a tontine 
 
238 See id. § 411(a)(2)(B)(ii) (“A plan satisfies the requirements of this clause if an employee 
who has completed at least 3 years of service has a nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of the 
employee’s accrued benefit derived from employer contributions.”); Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 § 203(a)(2)(B)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (same). 
239 Another option is to begin by considering an individual with an IRA. IRAs are not subject 
to ERISA, but the Internal Revenue Code rules that govern IRAs are very similar to the ERISA 
rules governing defined contribution plans. For example, both IRAs and pensions receive favorable 
tax treatment, and both are subject to the prohibited transactions rules. See supra Section I.B. We 
do not believe that there is anything in the Internal Revenue Code that would prevent an 
individual from having her IRA invest in a tontine fund or in a tontine annuity. Nor do we think 
that ERISA would prevent a participant with a self-directed 401(k) plan from investing in a 
tontine fund or annuity. 
Finally, there is no doubt that an employer can create a defined contribution plan, make 
contributions to that plan on behalf of its employees, and invest those contributions for the 
benefit of its employees. The question comes down to whether a plan sponsor can invest employer 
contributions in a tontine fund or tontine annuity knowing, as we do, that each employee will lose 
the balance in her account when she dies. We see no reason why a plan sponsor would be 
prohibited from doing so. (Granted, the spousal protection rules might impose forfeiture limits 
with respect to married participants. We discuss those rules infra subsection V.D.3). 
240 See I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012) (setting forth requirements for an employer’s stock bonus, 
pension, or profit-sharing plan to constitute a qualified trust); Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (enumerating obligations of a fiduciary with 
respect to such a plan). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., 
MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/ 
pdf/meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf (explaining to employers how to administer their 
retirement plans). 
241 I.R.C. § 401(a) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 403, 404(a), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1104(a) (2012). 
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pension or investing in tontine annuities, and we believe that the government 
would issue guidance supporting our position.242 
We believe that tontine funds, tontine annuities, and tontine pensions 
could be designed in ways that comply with applicable state and federal laws. 
C. Dealing with Market Volatility 
Unlike a traditional defined benefit pension plan that makes fixed or 
inflation-adjusted benefit payments, tontine pension benefit payments 
would be volatile. Monthly tontine-pension distributions would vary with 
fluctuations in the value of the underlying assets and with the variability 
inherent in the indeterminate timing of the deaths of the other participants 
in the tontine pension. The fluctuations attributable to the randomness of 
the deaths of other participants would largely disappear as long as there are 
enough participants in the tontine pension.243 
In contrast, the volatility due to fluctuations in the value of the underlying 
assets will not disappear. This is the same problem that any investor with a 
defined contribution plan or variable annuity confronts.244 For example, an 
investor who used the 4% rule to withdraw $40,000 from her individual 
account in 2007 when her stock portfolio was worth $1,000,000 could only 
withdraw around $20,000 in 2009 when that portfolio was worth just 
$500,000. An investor can minimize the effects of market volatility by 
investing conservatively in bonds, but the expected earnings on her portfolio 
could fall dramatically.245 
Of course, planning for that market volatility can help mitigate its 
impact. Wise consultants with irregular earnings generally spend no more 
money in the months that they get commissions than they do in the months 
that they do not. Similarly, the investor discussed in the previous paragraph 
could have spent just $30,000 of the $40,000 she withdrew in 2007 and saved 
the other $10,000 to spend in 2009 when she withdrew just $20,000. That is, 
 
242 Cf. Selection of Annuity Providers for Individual Account Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 52,021 
(proposed Sept. 12, 2007) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (proposing the establishment of a 
“safe harbor” for selecting annuity providers to distribute benefits from “individual account plans 
covered by title I” of ERISA). 
243 See supra subsection II.B.3.a. 
244 See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text. 
245 According to one projection, over the next 10 years, the expected return on U.S. stocks 
will be 7.25%, while the expected return on U.S. Treasury bonds will be just 0.50%. See BNY 
MELLON, 10-YEAR CAPITAL MARKET RETURN ASSUMPTIONS: CALENDAR YEAR 2013 
(2013), available at http://us.bnymellonam.com/core/library/documents/knowledge/market_ 
commentary/bny_mellon_10_Year_capital_market_return_assumptions_2013.pdf (presenting 10-
year capital market return assumptions based on social and economic changes). 
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individuals can smooth their consumption by underspending in the good 
years so that they can spend more in the lean years. Smoothing products, 
even “smoothed income annuities” can be purchased in the marketplace.246 
A tontine pension could itself be designed to provide smoother distribu-
tions. For example, monthly distributions could be smoothed over a one-
year or even a five-year period.247 When the tontine pension administrator 
determined that a certain monthly distribution would be higher than the 
average distribution over the prior five years, the distribution could be split. 
A basic distribution could go to the participant’s bank account immediately, 
and the excess could go into a “holding account” for the participant. In a 
later month when the tontine pension administrator determined that the 
distribution would otherwise be lower than the average for the prior five 
years, the holding account could be tapped to provide a larger distribution. 
The funds in the holding account could be invested with all of the other 
assets held by the tontine pension, and presumably, at that member’s death, 
any balance in her holding account could be paid to her estate. 
In short, income smoothing could be accomplished either inside or 
outside of a tontine pension. In any event, the volatility in monthly distri-
butions attributable to fluctuations in the value of the underlying invest-
ment assets held in a tontine pension is no worse a problem for tontine 
pensions than it is for defined contribution plans or variable annuities.  
D. Gender Issues 
1. In General 
While insurance companies can typically price the annuities that they 
offer to men and women differently, pension plans cannot offer different 
pricing based on gender.248 Pension plans cannot require higher 
contributions from women or pay women lower benefits.249 Therefore, 
 
246 See Per Linnemann, A New DC Concept from Denmark, RETIREMENT INCOME J. (Sept. 
4, 2013), http://retirementincomejournal.com/issue/september-5-2013/article/a-new-dc-concept-
from-denmark, archived at http://perma.cc/M89E-DWN7 (discussing Denmark’s success with 
“smoothed income annuities”). 
247 TIAA–CREF allows participants to choose variable annuity payments that change 
monthly or yearly. See TIAA–CREF FIN. SERVS., TIAA–CREF RETIREMENT STRATEGIES: 
HELPING YOU REACH YOUR RETIREMENT SAVINGS GOALS 35-36 (2006), available at 
https://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/pdf/retire_strategies.pdf (explaining how to choose a retirement plan). 
248 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
prohibits pension plans from requiring higher contributions from women than men or paying 
women lower benefits than men). 
249 Id. 
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when an employee retires with a traditional defined benefit pension, the 
retiree will see the same monthly pension benefits for life, regardless of 
gender. For example, CalSTRS pays identical pensions to retired men and 
women teachers who have the same service records.250 To be sure, defined 
benefit plan actuaries take the gender of participants and their partners into 
account when determining the contributions that the plan sponsor needs to 
make. Retiring women can expect to collect more monthly benefit checks 
than their male counterparts, but the monthly payments must be equal for 
men and women.251 
Tontine funds and tontine annuities could account for gender.252 
However, a tontine pension, like a traditional pension, would not be 
permitted to discriminate based on gender because Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 forbids this type of discrimination.253 A tontine pension 
can comply with this gender neutrality requirement by using unisex life 
expectancy tables, as this Article does with its model tontine pension.254 
2. Employee Contributions 
Title VII’s gender-neutrality requirement somewhat undermines the 
attractiveness of allowing participants to make additional voluntary contri-
butions to their employer-provided tontine pensions. To be sure, allowing 
employees to make supplemental contributions to their tontine pensions 
would enhance employees’ retirement incomes, just as voluntary 
contributions to 401(k) plans increase participants’ nest eggs and their 
retirement income. However, tontine pensions would be a better investment 
 
250 See supra Section IV.A (providing background on CalSTRS). 
251 On the other hand, a defined contribution plan can distribute lump sums to its retirees 
with the knowledge that the commercial annuities available to the retirees from private insurers 
will differ based on gender. As noted above, a 65-year-old man who purchased a $100,000 annuity 
in January of 2014 could receive $6864 a year for life, while a 65-year-old woman would receive 
$6408 a year because of her longer life expectancy. See supra subsection I.C.2 (explaining lifetime 
annuities). But see Heen, supra note 121 (discussing why we should ban gender discrimination in 
the sale of commercial annuities). 
252 See supra Sections II.B-C (providing an overview of tontine funds and tontine annuities). 
253 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
prohibits pension plans from requiring higher contributions from women than men or paying 
women lower benefits than men); see also Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 
1066 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that defendant’s use of sex-distinct tables for calculating contributions 
to a pension plan constituted unequal treatment on the basis of sex), vacated on other grounds, 463 
U.S. 1223 (1983). 
254 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Unisex tables are not a perfect solution, 
because they are less accurate than gender-specific tables. Unisex tables would, however, ensure 
that same-age men and women who make identical contributions receive identical monthly 
distributions, which is what Title VII requires for pensions. 
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for women than men, given their relative life expectancies. The typical man 
would be better off investing in a 401(k) plan or IRA (where gender is 
irrelevant), or in a typical commercial annuity sold by an insurance company 
(where gender can be considered).255 
3. Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuities & Qualified  
Domestic Relations Orders 
Under ERISA, defined benefit plans (and some defined contribution 
plans) are required to provide a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA) 
as the normal benefit payment for married participants, unless the spouse 
consents to another form of distribution.256 These plans are also required to 
provide a qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity (QPSA) option in case 
the worker dies before retirement.257 ERISA-covered pension plans also 
allow state courts to divide the pension benefits of married couples through 
qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs).258 Although not covered by 
ERISA, many public pension plans provide similar spousal protections.259 
Tontine pensions could also be designed to provide spousal protections. 
First, with respect to survivor benefits, rather than having a married 
participant forfeit her entire account balance at her death, a tontine pension 
could provide QJSAs and QPSAs. For example, when a participant dies, she 
might forfeit half of the balance in her account; the remaining half could be 
 
255 Again, see Heen, supra note 121 for a discussion as to why we should ban gender discrimi-
nation in the sale of annuities. 
256 I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (2012) (“[A] trust forming part of such plan shall not constitute a 
qualified trust under this section unless . . . the accrued benefit payable to such participant is 
provided in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity.”); id. § 417(a) (permitting partici-
pants to elect to waive the qualified joint and survivor annuity form, but requiring the participant’s 
spouse to consent in writing); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 205(a)-(c), 29 
U.S.C. § 1055(a)-(c) (2012) (same). A QJSA is an immediate annuity for the life of the pension 
plan participant and a survivor annuity for the life of the participant’s spouse. Id. § 205(d)(1), 29 
U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1). The amount of the survivor annuity may not be less than 50% nor more than 
100% of the amount payable during the time the participant and spouse are both alive. Id., 29 
U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1).  
257 Id. § 205(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a). A QPSA typically pays an annuity that is equal to the 
survivor’s portion of the QJSA. Id. § 205(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e).  
258 I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 206(d), 
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2012). 
259 See CAL. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., SURVIVORS & BENEFICIARIES FAQS: YOUR RETIREMENT 
APPLICATION AND OPTIONS WEBINAR, available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-
docs/about/video-web-center/videos/member-retirement/faq-survivors.pdf (explaining that some 
employers offer benefits to employees’ survivors and detailing those spousal protections). 
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retitled in the name of the surviving spouse.260 Second, a tontine pension 
could allow divorcing spouses to secure domestic relations orders that 
transfer a portion of the participant spouse’s tontine pension to the other 
spouse. This could allow the transferred portion to be retitled in the name 
of the transferee spouse.261 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we showed how large employers could use tontine 
pensions to provide retirement income for their employees. We developed a 
model tontine pension and used that model to show the retirement benefits 
that a typical worker could earn with a 10%-of-salary tontine pension. Over 
the course of a 30-year career, we estimated that a typical retiree would earn 
a uniform tontine pension that would initially replace approximately 55% of 
her pre-retirement earnings. Alternatively, that retiree would earn an 
inflation-adjusted tontine pension that would replace approximately 43% of 
her pre-retirement earnings. 
These tontine pensions have two major advantages over traditional 
defined benefit plan pensions. First, unlike traditional pensions, which are 
frequently underfunded, tontine pensions would always be fully funded. 
Second, unlike traditional pensions, where the plan sponsor must bear all 
the investment and actuarial risks, with a tontine pension, the plan sponsor 
would bear neither of those risks. These two features make the tontine 
pension a particularly attractive alternative for employers who care about 
providing retirement income security for their employees but want to avoid 
the risks associated with having a traditional pension. 
Tontine pensions also offer a possible solution to the chronic underfunding 
of state and local pension plans. For example, we showed how California 
could replace its $74 billion underfunded CalSTRS defined benefit plan 
with a tontine pension and never again have to worry about underfunding 
attributable to future benefit accruals.  
Finally, a tontine pension would closely resemble an actuarially fair variable 
life annuity, but could be run by a low-fee discount broker. No money would 
need to be set aside for insurance agent commissions or for insurance 
 
260 The tontine pension of a married couple might be shared between the spouses along the 
lines of earnings sharing. See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 23, at 205-06 (discussing the possibility of 
earnings sharing for Social Security). 
261 QDROs can present adverse selection and moral hazard issues. For example, what, if 
anything, should be done to prevent a dying spouse from getting a divorce and using a QDRO to 
transfer her tontine pension to her ex-spouse, rather than forfeiting it to the surviving members in 
her tontine pension plan? 
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company reserves, risk-taking, and profits. This means that tontine pensions 
would provide significantly higher benefits to retirees than commercial 
annuities. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1 is based on the Social Security Administration’s 2009 
unisex life table.262 For individuals aged 35 through 119, Column 1 shows 
their age (xi), Column 2 shows their life expectancy (ei), and Column 3 
shows their death probability (qi). Column 4 shows the force-of-mortality 
probabilities that we derived,263 and Columns 5 and 6 show the uniform and 
inflation-adjusted monthly annuity factors that we derived for the first 
month of each year starting with age 65.264 
 
Appendix Table 1: Unisex Life Tables, 2009, with Force-of-Mortality 
 Probabilities, and Monthly Annuity Factors265 
 
Age 
(xi) 
Life  
Expectancy 
(years) 
(ei) 
Death 
Probability
(qi) 
Force-of-
Mortality 
Probability
( fi) 
Uniform 
Monthly 
Annuity  
Factors for 
the First  
Month of the 
Year
Inflation-
adjusted 
Monthly 
Annuity 
Factors for the 
First Month of 
the Year 
35 44.90 0.001261 0.001262 n/a n/a 
36 43.95 0.001332 0.001333 n/a n/a 
37 43.01 0.001420 0.001421 n/a n/a 
38 42.07 0.001527 0.001528 n/a n/a 
39 41.14 0.001653 0.001655 n/a n/a 
40 40.20 0.001796 0.001798 n/a n/a 
41 39.27 0.001955 0.001957 n/a n/a 
42 38.35 0.002133 0.002135 n/a n/a 
43 37.43 0.002332 0.002334 n/a n/a 
44 36.52 0.002550 0.002553 n/a n/a 
 
262 Bye, supra note 109. 
263 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra notes 141 & 143 and accompanying text. 
265 This data is derived from Bye, supra note 109, and authors’ computations. The monthly 
annuity factors were determined using an interest rate of 7% and an inflation rate of 3%. 
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Age 
(xi) 
Life  
Expectancy 
(years) 
(ei) 
Death 
Probability
(qi) 
Force-of-
Mortality 
Probability
( fi) 
Uniform 
Monthly 
Annuity  
Factors for 
the First  
Month of the 
Year
Inflation-
adjusted 
Monthly 
Annuity 
Factors for the 
First Month of 
the Year 
45 35.61 0.002786 0.002790 n/a n/a 
46 34.71 0.003041 0.003046 n/a n/a 
47 33.81 0.003322 0.003328 n/a n/a 
48 32.92 0.003630 0.003637 n/a n/a 
49 32.04 0.003963 0.003971 n/a n/a 
50 31.17 0.004326 0.004336 n/a n/a 
51 30.30 0.004707 0.004718 n/a n/a 
52 29.44 0.005086 0.005099 n/a n/a 
53 28.59 0.005455 0.005470 n/a n/a 
54 27.74 0.005827 0.005844 n/a n/a 
55 26.90 0.006234 0.006253 n/a n/a 
56 26.07 0.006685 0.006708 n/a n/a 
57 25.24 0.007166 0.007192 n/a n/a 
58 24.42 0.007677 0.007707 n/a n/a 
59 23.60 0.008233 0.008267 n/a n/a 
60 22.80 0.008854 0.008893 n/a n/a 
61 21.99 0.009552 0.009598 n/a n/a 
62 21.20 0.010323 0.010376 n/a n/a 
63 20.42 0.011172 0.011235 n/a n/a 
64 19.64 0.012113 0.012187 n/a n/a 
65 18.88 0.013181 0.013269 117.6939 151.9876 
66 18.12 0.014374 0.014478 115.1577 147.7118 
67 17.38 0.015665 0.015789 112.5519 143.3919 
68 16.65 0.017056 0.017203 109.8756 139.0295 
69 15.93 0.018576 0.018751 107.1273 134.6252 
70 15.22 0.020314 0.020524 104.3072 130.1821 
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Age 
(xi) 
Life  
Expectancy 
(years) 
(ei) 
Death 
Probability
(qi) 
Force-of-
Mortality 
Probability
( fi) 
Uniform 
Monthly 
Annuity  
Factors for 
the First  
Month of the 
Year
Inflation-
adjusted 
Monthly 
Annuity 
Factors for the 
First Month of 
the Year 
71 14.53 0.022277 0.022529 101.4239 125.7133 
72 13.85 0.024406 0.024708 98.4856 121.2309 
73 13.18 0.026695 0.027058 95.4925 116.7370 
74 12.53 0.029207 0.029642 92.4424 112.2306 
75 11.89 0.032111 0.032638 89.3370 107.7160 
76 11.27 0.035415 0.036057 86.1922 103.2135 
77 10.66 0.038994 0.039774 83.0219 98.7408 
78 10.08 0.042837 0.043781 79.8263 94.2984 
79 9.50 0.047063 0.048206 76.6015 89.8822 
80 8.95 0.051906 0.053301 73.3500 85.4962 
81 8.41 0.057459 0.059175 70.0896 81.1612 
82 7.89 0.063648 0.065763 66.8410 76.9009 
83 7.40 0.070515 0.073124 63.6153 72.7270 
84 6.92 0.078164 0.081388 60.4220 68.6490 
85 6.46 0.086714 0.090706 57.2732 64.6789 
86 6.03 0.096263 0.101217 54.1842 60.8317 
87 5.62 0.106880 0.113035 51.1716 57.1238 
88 5.23 0.118606 0.126251 48.2522 53.5709 
89 4.87 0.131451 0.140931 45.4418 50.1868 
90 4.53 0.145412 0.157136 42.7539 46.9828 
91 4.21 0.160474 0.174918 40.2005 43.9682 
92 3.92 0.176613 0.194329 37.7928 41.1509 
93 3.66 0.193799 0.215422 35.5427 38.5397 
94 3.42 0.211994 0.238250 33.4649 36.1461 
95 3.20 0.230169 0.261584 31.5809 33.9883 
96 3.01 0.248041 0.285074 29.8776 32.0468 
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Age 
(xi) 
Life  
Expectancy 
(years) 
(ei) 
Death 
Probability
(qi) 
Force-of-
Mortality 
Probability
( fi) 
Uniform 
Monthly 
Annuity  
Factors for 
the First  
Month of the 
Year
Inflation-
adjusted 
Monthly 
Annuity 
Factors for the 
First Month of 
the Year 
97 2.84 0.265318 0.308317 28.3359 30.2968 
98 2.68 0.281695 0.330861 26.9285 28.7046 
99 2.54 0.296871 0.352215 25.6135 27.2223 
100 2.40 0.312977 0.375388 24.3250 25.7781 
101 2.27 0.330077 0.400592 23.0633 24.3718 
102 2.14 0.348236 0.428073 21.8287 23.0032 
103 2.02 0.367528 0.458120 20.6214 21.6719 
104 1.90 0.388029 0.491070 19.4415 20.3777 
105 1.78 0.409816 0.527321 18.2892 19.1201 
106 1.67 0.432975 0.567352 17.1642 17.8985 
107 1.56 0.457593 0.611739 16.0665 16.7122 
108 1.46 0.483763 0.661189 14.9955 15.5605 
109 1.37 0.511581 0.716582 13.9509 14.4422 
110 1.27 0.541150 0.779033 12.9316 13.3561 
111 1.18 0.572575 0.849977 11.9366 12.3004 
112 1.10 0.605968 0.931323 10.9641 11.2733 
113 1.02 0.641446 1.025675 10.0120 10.2718 
114 0.94 0.679129 1.136717 9.0770 9.2926 
115 0.86 0.719145 1.269917 8.1546 8.3307 
116 0.79 0.761624 1.433908 7.2383 7.3792 
117 0.73 0.806699 1.643507 6.3178 6.4282 
118 0.67 0.851378 1.906349 5.3799 5.4680 
119 0.61 0.893947 2.243816 4.0607 4.1685 
 
 
